TD n. 641 2015
Vitor Farinha Luz, Paulo Monteiro, Vinicius Nascimento Carrasco, Humberto Moreira.
We consider the problem of a seller who faces a privately informed buyer and only knows
one moment of the distribution from which values are drawn. In face of this uncertainty,
the seller maximizes his worst-case expected profits. We show that a robustness property
of the optimal mechanism imposes restrictions on the seller’s ex-post profit function. These
restrictions are used to derive the optimal mechanism. The optimal mechanism entails
distortions at the intensive margin, e.g., except for the highest value buyer, sales will take
place with probability strictly smaller than one. The seller can implement such allocation by
committing to post prices drawn from a non-degenerate distribution, so that randomizing
over prices is an optimal robust selling mechanism. We extend the model to deal with the
case in which: (i) M goods are sold and the buyer’s private information is multidimensional
and (ii) the seller and the buyer interact for several periods. In the case of multiple goods,
there are several optimal mechanisms. With multiple goods full bundling is optimal, as
well as selling the goods in a fully separable way. In the dynamic model, we show that
repetition, period by period, of the static-optimal mechanism is optimal.