Bernardo Calvente.

27/03/2017

Orientador: Tiago Couto Berriel.

Banca: Eduardo Zilberman. Marco Bonomo.

What should be the characteristics of the optimal monetary policy under commitment in the situation of “global liquidity trap” when Central Banks do not coordinate their actions? Using a two-country open economy model, we perform a numerical exercise in order to address this question and study the differences between this setting and a cooperative situation, when monetary authorities are not only worried with the national household utility but instead maximize a measure of world welfare. Our findings points towards differences of history and international dependence features of optimal monetary prescriptions in each of the observed cases. We also execute a welfare analysis of our experiment that suggests that a local Central Bank prefers, not only to stay restrained by zero lower bound on nominal interest rates for a longer period, but also that the foreign country exists this situation as early as possible. Lastly, we make a robustness analysis of our results varying the size of each nation and the degree of substitution of the composite goods produced in each locality.

M389