Juan Francisco Santini.

29/03/2019

Orientador: Claudio Ferraz.

Banca: Bruno Ferman. Gustavo Gonzaga. Juliano Assunção. Rudi Rocha.

Essays on State Effectiveness: Information, Tax Collection and Hierarchies

Nível: Doutorado

This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first one we investigate whether the provision of information about research findings regarding effectiveness of policies cause political leaders to enact policy change. To do so, we use two types of experiments to measure elected heads of government: (1) demand for research and (2) policy responses to supply of research. We find that policymakers are willing to pay relatively high amounts to learn the results of impact evaluations, update their posterior over the expected impact of a policy in the “correct” direction if informed of research findings, and pay more for types of studies that subsequently affect their beliefs more. Correspondingly, providing information about research findings indicating positive, cost-effective impact of a policy increases the probability that mayors implement the policy in their own municipality by 10 percentage points. In the second chapter, we study the role that revenue shocks play on government investment in fiscal capacity. Using a differencein-difference event-study design, we analyze local budget adjustments to an exogenous revenue shock in formula transfers to Brazilian municipalities. We find that positive revenue shocks translate into additional spending, while the adjustment after a negative shock depends on local characteristics. On average, municipalities increase tax collection, but this effect disappears in jurisdictions with low-educated mayors, which rather tend to cut expenditures. We show that hiring tax related workers is the main mechanism behind the increase in tax revenues. In the third chapter, we follow the theory of knowledge-based hierarchies to study the internal organization of municipal governments in Brazil. Using detailed matched employer-employee data, we construct bureaucrats’ hierarchies within municipalities and show that the empirical patterns match the theoretical predictions. We then present suggestive evidence linking the organization structure in which bureaucrats operate and public sector productivity