PUC Rio | Departamento de Economia

The political economy of fiscal multipliers

27/03/2017

This paper investigates if fiscal fragility influences the magnitude of fiscal multipliers. We define states of fiscal fragility based on the literature on politico-institutional determinants of fiscal deficits. Using quarterly data for 44 countries, we find that fiscal multipliers in fiscally fragile economies are smaller than in economies expected to have greater surpluses.

M 386

Gustavo Cicchelli de Sá Vieira.

Orientador: Eduardo Zilberman.

Banca: Luciano Vereda Oliveira. Tiago Couto Berriel.

Mais Informações Baixar arquivo

The politics of government advertisement: evidence from Brazil

27/03/2017

Using an unique data set of central government expenditure on advertising in Brazil, we shed light on the behavior of public advertisers and on the relation between government ads and voting. In particular, we investigate political motivations behind the allocation of the advertisement budget by the federal government and its impacts on voting. Borrowing insights from the literature of distributive politics in Political Science, we first correlate ads money and votes for the government's party on the local level. Next, we exploit plausible exogenous variation on FM radio signal coverage to test if money spent on ads turn into votes for the government's party. Our findings show that although past presidential election outcomes predict where in the territory the government places ads, voters do not seem to be persuaded by those ads to favor the party in power.

M387

Bernardo Barboza Ribeiro.

Orientador: Claudio Ferraz.

Banca: Juliano Assunção. Raphael Bottura Corbi .

Mais Informações Baixar arquivo

Optimal monetary policy in a global liquidity trap

27/03/2017

What should be the characteristics of the optimal monetary policy under commitment in the situation of “global liquidity trap” when Central Banks do not coordinate their actions? Using a two-country open economy model, we perform a numerical exercise in order to address this question and study the differences between this setting and a cooperative situation, when monetary authorities are not only worried with the national household utility but instead maximize a measure of world welfare. Our findings points towards differences of history and international dependence features of optimal monetary prescriptions in each of the observed cases. We also execute a welfare analysis of our experiment that suggests that a local Central Bank prefers, not only to stay restrained by zero lower bound on nominal interest rates for a longer period, but also that the foreign country exists this situation as early as possible. Lastly, we make a robustness analysis of our results varying the size of each nation and the degree of substitution of the composite goods produced in each locality.

M389

Bernardo Calvente.

Orientador: Tiago Couto Berriel.

Banca: Eduardo Zilberman. Marco Bonomo.

Mais Informações Baixar arquivo

Informationally efficient markets under rational inattention

24/03/2017

We propose a new solution for the Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] paradox. By substituting
a rational inattention restriction for their information structure, we show that prices can reflect all the information available without breaking the incentives of market participants to gather information. This model reframes the efficient market hypothesis and reconciles opposing views: prices are fully revealing but only for those who are sufficiently smart. Finally, we develop a method for postulating and solving Walrasian general equilibrium models with rationally inattentive agents circumventing previous tractability assumptions.

M 384

André Medeiros Sztutman.

Orientador: Carlos Viana de Carvalho.

Co-orientador: Tiago Couto Berriel.

Banca: Leonardo Rezende. Felipe Iachan.

Mais Informações Baixar arquivo

Demographics and the Fisher Effect in the Nineteenth Century

24/03/2017

There is little response of nominal interest rates to inflationary movements in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, while the Fisher equation would predict a one-to-one relation between these economic variables. Most of the previous answers to this observation rely on some sort of irrationality argument (Fisher (1906), Friedman and Schwartz (1982), Summers (1983) and Barsky and De Long (1991) are some examples) or state that there are problems in the data used (Perez and Siegler (2003)). In this thesis, I argue that this is not due to agent irrationality, but to the lowering of the equilibrium interest rate level as a response to a demographic transition attributed to advances in medical science and enhancements in sanitation infrastructure. I build an stylized overlapping generations model based on Gertler (1999) that captures the main features of the American Economy during this period, then calibrate it and conduct experiments to show that Barsky and De Long's (1991) "strike" on the Fisher Effect does not hold when the demographic channel is turned off.

M 385

Matheus de Barros Santa Lucci e Silva.

Orientador: Carlos Viana de Carvalho.

Banca: Eduardo Zilberman. Cezar Santos.

Mais Informações Baixar arquivo

Protests, concession and repression in a networked society

29/04/2016

We develop a sequential game between groups of individuals taking part in a mass protest and a democratic government facing electoral constraints. The groups are connected by a network of participation externalities, as participation from individuals generate arbitrary heterogeneous externalities in members of other groups. This setting allows us to study a myriad of unexplored phenomena like how the presence of strong leaderships or radical groups affect protests' pattern of participation and the likelihood of repression. Our results explain in particular how the recent communication revolution affected protests' outcomes. In a nutshell, our results indicate that horizontal protests are more likely repressed and unpopular radical groups diminished the likelihood of ousting the incumbent from office, implying that the government will use any means at its disposal in order to consolidate radical groups.

M383

Pedro Bessone Tepedino.

Orientador: Vinicius Nascimento Carrasco.

Banca: Leonardo Rezende. Thierry Verdier. Bernardo Vasconcellos Guimarães.

Dissertação de Mestrado

The political economy of fiscal multipliers

The politics of government advertisement: evidence from Brazil

Optimal monetary policy in a global liquidity trap

Informationally efficient markets under rational inattention

Demographics and the Fisher Effect in the Nineteenth Century

Protests, concession and repression in a networked society

Legalize it? The effects of California's medical marijuana law on violent crime

The added worker effect for married women and children in Brazil: a propensity score approach

Populism in general equilibrium :indirect efects on political support

Term structure of variance and dividend returns

Inflation Financing and banks balance sheet: a fiscalist stagflation

Instrument Selection and Identification of Macroeconomic Equilibrium Conditions

(Your) ignorance is bliss :robust moral hazard

Changes in the Brazilian yield curve responses to monetary shocks

Robust Regulation of a Monopolist

Electoral Re-registration, Disenfranchisement and Public Service Provision

Introducing Capital in a Three-Sector Model of Structural Transformation: A Cross-Country Analysis

Choosing Institutions Locally: Determinants of Legislative Size in Brazil

Do Politicians Respond to Political Protests? Effects of the 2013 Protests in Brazil

The Labor Market in Brazil and the 2008 Financial Crisis: An Analysis Based on the Flow Approach

Login - Área do Aluno

Busque aqui