

**Beatriz Figueiredo Velho** 

## **Negative Role Model Effects on Education:**

The Impact of Successful Soccer Players on Brazilian Schools' Performance

## Monografia de Conclusão de Curso

Dissertation presented to the Programa de Graduação em Economia of the Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio, as a fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bacharel em Economia

> Advisor: Prof. Eduardo Zilberman Co-advisor: Carlos Viana

> > Rio de Janeiro June 2017



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"Declaro que o presente trabalho é de minha autoria e que não recorri para realizá-lo, a nenhuma forma de ajuda externa, exceto quando autorizado pelo professor tutor".

Beatriz Figueiredo Velho

Rio de Janeiro June 2017

"As opiniões expressas neste trabalho são de responsabilidade única e exclusiva do autor"

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#### 1. Introduction

When young people decide whether to attend school or not, they take numerous variables into account: personal or familial health conditions (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Alderman et al, 2001; Maluccio et al, 2009), age-grade distortion (Manacorda, 2012; Glick and Sahn, 2010), parental income (Caucutt and Lochner, 2012), family needs (Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2014), pregnancy (Rosenberg et al, 2014), among others. These are just some of the considerations they must weigh when comparing schooling returns to those of dropping out, and deciding which is the best path.

The financial gains that people ascribe to schooling, however, are not necessarily consistent with measured returns to education, biasing enrollment decisions. Unfortunately, these perceptions are often quite imprecise and may lead students to make suboptimal choices. An experiment run with eighth-grade boys in the Dominican Republic (Jensen, 2010) points to this phenomenon; its findings indicate that, although returns to completing high school are high, students' perceived returns to that level of education are extremely low.

The study also gathers evidence on the impact of these perceptions on schooling demand. By informing students in randomly assigned schools about the benefits of completing their secondary education, the author finds that the discovery that schooling returns are higher than those originally perceived leads students to complete on average 0.20-0.35 more years of school over the next four years. Nguyen (2008) runs a similar experiment with students in Madagascar, finding that giving students information about the real returns of education, which are higher than their expectations, increases attendance rates and test performance.

Analogous results were found in a study conducted by Attanasio and Kaufmann (2013). Using junior and senior high school data on poor Mexican households, they find that expected returns and perceived risks have an impact on two educational choices: enrolling in senior high school and entering college. In particular, their findings suggest that girls' expectations do not affect both schooling decisions, which are better predicted by their mothers' expectations. Boys' perceptions, on the other hand, are determinants of their choice of entering college, but don't predict the senior high school enrollment. In fatherless families, however, boys' expected returns increase the likelihood of enrolling in high school.

Perceived returns to education seem, therefore, to have an important role in schooling choices. But what determines these perceptions? Parents' expectations, the lack of information about the job market, high discount rates, and opportunity costs are some reasonable answers. Nguyen (2008) points to role models as another possible cause. Through his experiment in Madagascar, he also finds that poor children's test scores are positively impacted by contact with educated role models of poor background.

Nguyen's results indicate that good role models from a similar economic background have a positive impact on education. On the other hand, there seems to be no evidence in existing literature on negative educational role model effects. In this work, we shed some light on the effect of successful uneducated role models on educational indicators using data on Brazilian soccer players.

Negative role models in education must be studied because they are potential causes for bad schooling performance. By knowing if they are causing dropouts or lower grades, educators can prevent their students to be influenced by them. If such casual relation is verified, schools may, for instance, follow Nguyen's experiment and bring good role models to their students' daily life in order to compensate the effect.

We have chosen soccer players as role models for a set of reasons. Firstly, it is a profession where success is not obviously related to educational achievement. In fact, only 2% of players in Brazil's 2016 Série A<sup>1</sup> were ever enrolled in tertiary education<sup>2</sup>. Secondly, although more than 80% of Brazilian players earn less than twice the minimum wage<sup>3</sup> (Brazilian Football Confederation, 2016), successful players are extremely well paid compared to other professionals, having a reputational effect on perceived returns of pursuing a soccer career. Moreover, soccer's popularity in Brazil is such that, in 2013, it had been the first sport ever practiced by 59.8% of the population and the most practiced sport by 66.2% of men and 54% of people between the ages of 15 and 19 (Ministry of Sports, 2013)<sup>4</sup>. This widespread engagement and admiration make becoming a professional soccer player the dream of many young boys who are passionate about the sport. Finally, many players have been raised in smaller cities, poor neighborhoods, or slums; more than half of the players in our database had an impoverished upbringing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The first league in Brazilian football league competition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> http://globoesporte.globo.com/futebol/brasileirao-serie-a/noticia/2016/06/graduados-da-bola-apenas-14-atletas-da-serie-alcancam-ensino-superior.html

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> http://www.cbf.com.br/noticias/a-cbf/raio-x-do-futebol-salario-dos-jogadores#.WQdbd4jyu00

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> http://www.esporte.gov.br/diesporte/2.html

These few extremely successful individuals with great exposure in the media, who have generally become successful through a means other than education, and who often were born in places where the value of education is underestimated, provide us – through no fault of their own – with potential candidates for a negative role model effect.

The main hypothesis of this study is the existence of a negative relationship between these role models' success and the schooling attendance of boys raised in the same communities as them. By crossing hand-collected data on soccer players and school-level education data released by the Ministry of Education, we check not only for that impact, but also for the players' influence on another outcome related to school engagement – students' performance on standardized tests. Our estimations rely on a difference-in-difference model, controlling for a wide set of schools' and students' characteristics.

Rossi and Ruzzier (2014) have provided some evidence on how much higher the payoffs and opportunities of becoming a soccer player are for male individuals, making boys more likely to be affected by players' success than girls. With that in mind, we selected a male-only sample in this analysis. We test for the impact of players' success on most of the indicators of schools close to where these players were raised. The presence of a negative relationship between the existence of neighborhood soccer stars and schooling performance indicators would hint at the strength of our results.

Our findings don't allow us to draw ultimate conclusions about the influence of soccer players in education. On the one hand, we estimate a statistically significant relation between players' success and dropout rates: successful players temporarily increase dropout rates, particularly among public and urban schools. However, in our robustness checks, the estimated impact of players' success on students' grades – measured by performance on standardized tests - were neither consistent with the previous specifications nor with our main hypothesis. We believe there are other tests we could do before drawing final conclusions.

The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the different datasets used in this research. Section 3 lays out the empirical strategy adopted for the estimations. Section 4 depicts the main results found. Section 5 presents some robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the impacts of negative role models on education in Brazil.

#### 2. Data

The data used in this research comes from three main sources: the Brazilian School Census, Prova Brasil – a standardized test and questionnaire answered by students, principals and teachers – and hand-collected data on soccer players from Brazil. To get schooling information, we used the censuses and Prova Brasil's answers for the 2007-2015 period, while the soccer players' data was built with information available on Transfer Markt<sup>5</sup> for the same period. We also sourced information from several news vehicles to gather some personal data about each soccer player (specifically, the neighborhood/area where the player was born and his socio-economic background at infancy).

### 2.1 Education Data

Between 1995 and 2006, the Brazilian School Census was collected at the school level. Despite being a simpler manner of gathering information, this approach led to several imprecisions in the data. One of the more serious issues with data prior to 2007 is double counting: given that parents would often enroll their child in more than one school so as to guarantee that they'd have a spot somewhere, students would show up in multiple schools during the same schoolyear. Moreover, given that the data was aggregated at the school level (there was no student-specific data), it was impossible to cross information from different schools in order to find out which schools the duplicated students were in fact attending. As such, the values for annual student flows – necessary to estimate dropout rates – aren't properly calculated during this period.

To mitigate such data issues and to improve the accuracy of its information, the Brazilian government changed the way of collecting School Census' data beginning in 2007. At this point, student-level data became available, allowing us to properly get rid of double counting. Not only did this methodological change in data collection and storage better the calculation of our indicators of interest, but it also made the estimation of performance metrics by gender and grade possible. Since in this work we assume that soccer players' success impacts only boys' educational decisions, it is key to have variables calculated by gender.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *Transfer Markt* is a German-based website dedicated to gather soccer information, such as results, scores and transfer news.

For 2007-2015, we were able to calculate dropout rates separately for boys and girls using the Brazilian Census' microdata. Due to data non-availability, however, these calculations are not ideally precise<sup>6</sup>. Even so, since the inaccuracies are not too damaging for our estimations and allow us a male-focused analysis, we use these rates as the main outcomes of interest.

Another outcome variable available for the same period is the students' performance on Prova Brasil, a national level standardized test tracked for students that attended the last years of lower, middle or high school. To better explain the context in which Prova Brasil's exams are taken, we must briefly present the Basic Education Evaluation System (Sistema de Avaliação da Educação Básica/Saeb), a group of large scale exams instituted in 1990. Saeb was administered for the first time to a sample of lower and middle public schools in urban areas, hoping to measure students' scholastic performance on Portuguese, mathematics and the natural sciences. Students in specific grades also had to write an essay. This format was kept up to 1993.

In 1995, the test started being built and the results analyzed based on a new methodology that allows for comparisons of the results over time: the Item Response Theory (IRT). It was also decided that the students assessed would be those who attended one of the senior years of lower, middle, and high school. From 1990 to 1999, there were several changes involving the subject areas covered: between 2001 and 2011 only Portuguese and mathematics were tested, but evaluations on the natural sciences were reincluded in 2013.

Between 1990 and 2003, the tests were administered to a subset of all schools, which allowed for records of results at the state, regional, and national levels. The sampling nature of the exams would persist until 2005, when Saeb became a combination of two exams: the National Basic Education Exam (Avaliação Nacional da Educação Básica) and the National School Performance Exam (Avaliação Nacional do Rendimento Escolar), also known, respectively, as Aneb and Prova Brasil.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Census' collection has two steps: a survey answered by the schools' principals at the beginning of the school year and another questionnaire filled at the end of year (Inep, 2009). In the second stage, the students are classified according to one of the four situations: approval, failure, dropping out or passing away. However, only the first survey is released to the public, leaving us with no information about what exactly happened during the school year. The best approximation I could get to male dropout rates involved checking which students vanished from our datasets every two years. This approach has the disadvantage of not distinguishing the reasons for the disappearance: killed students can be mistaken for dropouts, overvaluating our rates. On the other hand, it is unlikely that players' success affects students' mortality, which probably makes the estimation of strong effects related only to the dropout component.

Although evaluating a subset of schools was still the norm for both public and private school evaluations where Aneb was concerned, Prova Brasil's exams are taken by all municipal, state and federal public schools with at least 20 students registered in the grades tested. Due to this, a biannual performance panel at the school level is available between 2007 and 2015.

Therefore, one of our outcome variables – specifically, male school dropout rates – was calculated using the school census microdata between 2007-2015. Prova Brasil's results, however, are available for the years spanning 2007-2015. Appropriately, Prova Brasil is also disaggregated by gender, allowing us to assign the variation in these values by gender; two groups that we believe respond differently to soccer players' success.

### 2.2 Soccer players' data

To draw any inference on the role model effect of soccer players, I need data on the year during which they became successful, the poor community/neighborhood where they were born and their socioeconomic status prior to reaching stardom.

I have developed 5 different definitions of success for this purpose: becoming a professional player, playing for one of the 12 biggest Brazilian teams, playing for one of the World's 30 biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team or being transferred for more than 6 million dollars. Transfer Markt, a website that records every career transaction that a soccer player has gone through, allows us to track the exact moment in time upon which a player met one or more of the thresholds of "success".

Data on a player's residency at childhood and his socioeconomic background were both collected manually from multiple sources in the internet. Said sources were not in all instances reliable and, therefore, should be considered with caution. Even so, we have mild confidence that data errors should be random and, as such, not severely detract from our estimation.

#### 3. Methodology and Empirical Strategy

At first, the emergence of soccer players in different communities may look like a random event – innate talent is, after all, orthogonal to socioeconomic characteristics. However, given the disparity of opportunities caused by social inequality in Brazil, soccer players' success may involve self-selection. Since obstacles faced by impoverished people, such as having to work to help provide for their families, increase the opportunity costs of schooling, they make the prospect of becoming a soccer player much more attractive. It is plausible, therefore, that there might be a correlation between players' success and unobservable characteristics that determine educational choice.

It is unlikely that such unobservable aspects change over the short period of time observed in this study. To take advantage of this, we employ a panel difference-indifferences model with entities fixed effects, hoping that this approach might help control for temporally constant unobservables. The observation units evaluated are schools, those of which are in the vicinity of where a successful soccer player was raised are then considered to be in the treatment group for our 2007-2015 observation period.

It is possible that events in the observed period that affect our educational outcomes may transpire and cannot be measured. The omission of these occurrences creates biases, leading to possible over or underestimations of the estimated effect. Unfortunately, this concern cannot be addressed by the difference-in-differences approach. For national changes, such as public policies that may affect outcomes similarly for all schools, I use time fixed effects, which control for general variations in each year. The same cannot be done for local changes, such as local policies or projects that affect the outcomes in particular places. Anyhow, since most of these interventions impact the outcomes in an opposite way to the expected effect of players' success (e.g. public policies tend to reduce dropout rates, while players' success increase them), the persistence of this effect, even when omitting such variables, suggests an economically strong result. We attempt to use a wide set of controls to help mitigate or eliminate the effects of other variables that might introduce bias in the same direction as our treatment.

Given the considerations above, the model used is

 $Education_{it} = \alpha + \beta.Success_{it} + \gamma.X_{it} + \zeta_t + \delta_i + \varepsilon_{it}$ 

Where *Education*<sub>*it*</sub> is the outcome of interest (such as dropout rates) for school *i* in year *t*, *Success*<sub>*it*</sub> denotes a dummy variable that equals 1 when a soccer player raised in the community where school *i* is placed achieves success,  $X_{it}$  indicates a set of school-

level controls,  $\zeta_t$  is a year-specific fixed effect,  $\delta_i$  denotes a school fixed effect,  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is a random error term, and  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$  and  $\gamma$  are regression coefficients to be estimated.

As specified in the previous section, the education indicators used in the estimation above come from two main datasets: the school censuses and Prova Brasil's microdata. As outcomes of interest, we use four different indicators constructed using the censuses' microdata. Three of them consist of dropout, approval and failure rates calculated by the Ministry of Education (MEC). The other is the male dropout rate, which we have calculated using student-level microdata. The last one differs from the others in two important aspects: it is disaggregated by gender, although somewhat more imprecise.

Prova Brasil's data makes available another key outcome of interest: schools' average performance on Portuguese Language and Mathematics standardized tests. We also use this indicator as a variable of interest to check if the players' success affects performance on these tests.

The controls used for the census' flow variables are the ones available in the census, which refer to schools' aspects (e.g. sanitation, availability of computers, number of rooms). Despite capturing the conditions of the schools or even proxying for living conditions of students who live near them, this set of controls lacks personal information on students' living standards. Prova Brasil, on the other hand, has a lot of data on students' socioeconomic characteristics, including if their parents encourage them to study or if any student has attended school carrying weapons during the last year.

Unfortunately, Prova Brasil's sample is smaller than the census', which covers all schools in Brazil. Consequently, we could not use Prova Brasil's set of controls in the flow variables regressions. Therefore, while flow regressions are more convenient because of their representative sample, the performance estimation has the advantage of having better controls.

As for the measure of the players' success, we tested the seven success criteria mentioned in the data section considering different duration periods for its impact (one to five years).

#### 4. Results

### 4.1 Main results

In this section, we empirically estimate our model using the schools' male dropout rates as dependent variable. Table 1 presents those estimations, testing a bunch of models for all the success measures considered in this work. The table is divided into 7 panels, each of them referring to one of the measures. The panels are composed of 5 groups of exactly the same 3 regressions, differing only in the period throughout which success is ongoing. Therefore, in the first group of regressions, we use dummies that turn on only in the year the player has achieved success – i.e. we consider that the impact lasts one year. Similarly, the second group's variable of success lasts 2 years – the year of success and the following one. We also do that for 3, 4 and 5 years.

The first estimation within each group has an unique regressor: the measure of success. The second, also controls for school and year fixed effects, and the third, controls for fixed effects and another set of variables<sup>7</sup>, including female dropout rates.

Before looking at the results, we must consider that the dropout rates used in Table 1 were calculated for the entire school, instead of only for the most susceptible students<sup>8</sup>. It is unlikely that 1<sup>st</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> grade students of lower school have the same level of discretion over their enrollment in school as do high school students. That is, we are possibly aggregating students who respond differently to soccer players' success in our dependent variable, making it on average less responsive to the treatment. We should, therefore, expect our estimations to be diluted, which would make the presence of statistically and economically significant results a sign of strong effects.

The most expected behavior for our estimations would be the finding of smaller effects in the first years, followed by a rise, reaching a peak, and then a decline. Such a trajectory would mean that soccer players' success gradually affects students'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The controls used were the numbers of overhead projectors, administrative computers, computers for students' use, employees, and dummy variables that identified if the schools have internet access and if they feed their students. We have chosen these regressors because we believe they were the best available variables to work as proxies for characteristics that may affect the way the students respond to players' success. They could, for instance, proxy students' income - a factor that, as explained in section 4.2, may determine how they are impacted by players' success.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> We built the measure identifying, for each school, the number of students in *t* that remained enrolled in any school in t+I, subtracted that number from the total of students in *t* and divided it also by the total of students in *t*. In other words, students that disappeared from the dataset from one year to the next were considered dropouts. The grades considered in the construction of these variables were all of lower and middle school and 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> years of high school.

performance, with a temporary effect. We believe the impact should not be immediate because we expect that it should increase as the students get more involved with professional soccer. On the other hand, the effect should vanish as students leave school and learn the actual returns of dropping out to be a soccer player are not as high as they have imagined, not perpetuating itself for the following generations/years.

It is worth noting that the third model within the groups – the one that also controls for a set of variables – presents an issue of endogeneity. As exposed in Table 2, female dropout rates are similarly affected by the players' success, which leads to correlation between these regressors within the model. The persistence of significant effects in such models points to the presence of solid correlation between players' success and dropout rates. Anyhow, we believe there is a strong component of randomness in the achievement of success in soccer career, making the set of controls not essential. For that reason, we focus on interpreting the second estimations' results<sup>9</sup>.

Panel A suggests consistent results with our main hypothesis: the dropout rates increased in 0,56 percentage points for schools placed in communities where individuals became professional players. However, the estimation is statistically significant only for the 3-year success measure, making it possibly a random effect. Nevertheless, it could also be the case that, due to our dilutive effect in the dropout rates, we can only identify the strongest effects in the whole sample – the apex of our estimates.

The other panels indicate a contrary effect, with most of them showing a negative relation between players' success and male dropout rates. Panel B's results are mostly statistically insignificant, suggesting that, when an individual plays professional soccer out of his country for the first time, male dropout rates of schools placed in his community of origin do not change. The estimation considering a 5-year treatment presents significant results, which could mean, once again, random effects or dilution due to the large sample.

Results exposed in Panels C and G, where we see consistently flipping signs and varying statistical significance, seem to be random – they are no more than noise, and there is nothing to be inferred. Therefore, it looks like having a player being transferred to a foreign team or playing for the Brazilian national team for the first time does not affect schools' dropout rates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> All the coefficients mentioned along the text, except when the contrary is specified, are estimated according to the second specification.

On the other hand, Panels D, E and F are composed of statistically significant effects that rise and decline over time, just as we would expect. The estimations, however, are negative, suggesting that soccer players' success does not increase dropout rates, but reduces them. Considering that all panels refer to more advanced stages of success – being transferred for more than US\$ 6 million, playing for one of the 12 greatest Brazilian teams and playing for one of the European biggest teams -, a possible explanation could be a mean-reverting process.

The effects could be positive when boys raised in poor communities become professional players because, at the same time this is the first step they take into a soccer career, it happens when the players are still connected to their communities. On the other hand, it is plausible that, once famous and distant from home, their influence decreases, making measures of later success less impactful. We believe that happens for two reasons: the lower contact with community residents and the fact that students attending school at this point of the player's career are probably from generations that have seen the previous dropouts fail.

Therefore, if dropout rates increase as community members become professional players and gradually come back to their previous trends after some time, depending on the period observed, different effects should be estimated. That is, if we consider the success is impacting dropout rates in the beginning of the players' careers, we should find positive effects. However, if we consider the success starts at a more advanced stage of his professional soccer experience, we might capture the mean-reverting effects, finding negative coefficients.

If such is the case, it is possible that we are dealing with a role model effect followed by a learning effect. In other words, the soccer players' success could be firstly increasing dropout rates. However, when the dropouts don't get as successful as they expected, the younger generations learn that a soccer career is probably not much prosperous, opting for stay at school and, consequently, bringing dropout rates back to their initial value.

Yet, if the mean-reverting argument is correct, we should expect that playing for the Brazilian national team – which represents a high level in soccer career – would affect dropout rates just as being transferred for more than US\$ 6 million or playing for a big team. As noted before, that is not the case. Our guess for the lack of effects remains on the fact that we have a shorter number of observations for the Brazilian national team's players than we have for other success measures.

#### 4.2 Heterogeneous Effects

In the previous section, we have mentioned that effects from Table 1 could be diluted because our dropout rates covered groups that are unlikely affected by soccer players' success. Actually, there is another reason for our effects to be weakened: the large nature of the sample used in our estimations. The mechanism behind this cause for dampened effects is simple: by using such a wide sample, we are probably comparing quite different schools, which means building inappropriate treatment and control groups.

Indeed, a part of the differences could be captured by the school fixed effects used in our estimations. Even though, there could be unobservable characteristics that are not constant over time whose effect cannot be captured by such variables. Public schools' students, for instance, may have unobserved characteristics that make them more susceptible to leaving school when a player becomes successful. If such is the case, by using treatment and control groups that include both public and private schools, we could be aggregating schools whose students respond differently to the treatment. Consequently, with private schools' students not being as affected as public schools' students, the average effect should be smaller than with a sample restricted to public schools.

One of these particularities is possibly related to the value their parents give to education: parents who enroll their children in private schools are probably more willing to pay for education, signaling they have higher schooling perceived returns. The difference in how they value education can determine the way they support their children to study, which in turn may affect their decision of leaving school to become a soccer player. Parents who give more value to studying may, for example, punish more severely the negligence of their kids, giving them less incentives to follow that path.

Public and private schools' students can also differ in their actual returns to education, given that the costs of leaving school are higher for richer students<sup>10</sup>. Among these costs there are the social costs faced by wealthier individuals, who live in an environment where the decision of dropping out has more stigma. Richer children also face greater opportunity costs of leaving school: the expected returns of education are extremely higher for students who attend better schools, such that they have much more to lose by dropping out. Moreover, they don't face financial costs as poorer students do.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> In Brazil, private schools are often considered better than public schools. As expected, they are also more attended by richer kids.

In case of financial recessions, for example, poorer students are much more likely to dropout to help with their families' support. In short, all these costs may increase public schools' students' probability of dropping out, making them more responsive to soccer players' success than private schools' students.

In order to assign that problem, we check for the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects. We start by testing the same regressions in Table 1 with samples reduced to, firstly, public schools, and then, private schools. Finding more significant and stronger effects only in one of the groups would provide evidence that the effect is valid for a single group of individuals and allow us to see the true effects in that group. That is exactly what happens.

In Table 3, our sample is reduced to public schools, and the results presented are quite similar to those in Table 1. Almost all of the coefficients in Table 3 are at least as, if not more, statistically significant than those of Table 1. The estimations in Table 3 are also stronger, which suggests that, in fact, our results have been diluted when we used the whole sample.

On the other hand, we see almost no significant effects for any of the measures in Table 4 - where we used a sample of private schools -, except for playing for the Brazilian National team. As for Tables 1 and 3, the coefficients considering this measure of success present flipping signs and varying statistical significance, which, once again, could be a sign of random effects.

The lack of significant effects on private schools' dropout added to the similar and stronger effects for public schools are evidences of heterogeneous effects – apparently, public schools' students are the ones who get affected by soccer players' success.

Yet, there could also be heterogeneity related to other characteristics of our sample, such as the schools' location. We believe that most soccer schools<sup>11</sup> are established in bigger cities, which makes the access to them easier for kids that live in urban places. This hypothesis is tested by Tables 5 and 6.

In Table 5, we restrict the sample to rural schools. The coefficients estimated are mostly statistically insignificant when we control for fixed effects, except for the great European team and Brazilian national team measures. As in the first tables, the effects of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Becoming a professional soccer player in Brazil usually requires attending to a soccer school. These schools are spread all over the country and are usually managed by professional soccer teams. They offer training and contacts to junior players that stand out, giving them opportunities to pursue a soccer career. Players usually enroll at a young age – around 12 to 14 years old.

playing for the national team seem random. Given that the coefficients are statistically insignificant using all other measures, we believe that, for the European team measure, we could be dealing, once again, with noisy regressions.

The coefficients in Table 6, on the contrary, are quite similar to those in Table 1, suggesting that the effects might also be stronger among urban schools. Although not parabolic shaped, the coefficients in Panel A are positive and statistically significant for all the success-lasting periods considered, indicating that the effects were probably diluted in Table 1's regressions. Other panels present a very similar behavior to their correspondents in Table 1.

The results in Tables 3-6 suggest, therefore, that urban and public schools are more affected by soccer players' success. It is possible that effects are even stronger for schools that meet both criteria. To check for that possibility, we run the same regressions of the previous tables with a sample of public and urban schools in Table 7.

We find promising results when we use becoming a professional player as a measure of success. They are positive, statistically significant for every lasting period considered here (1 to 5 years), stronger compared to the estimations in Tables 3 and 6 and parabolic shaped – growing in significance and intensity, reaching a 0.78 percentage points increasing effect for the 3-year dummy, and decreasing after that.

The coefficients for other measures are quite similar to those in Table 6, being mostly stronger and more statistically significant – with exception of playing for a great European team, where the effects are similar, but subtly smaller. Comparing to Table 3, the pattern for Panels B to G is a bit different: the effects are similar in signs, intensity and significance, but are consistently weaker and less significant. We believe this happens because the increase in dropout rates caused by becoming a professional player seems to last longer in this group. Therefore, if the negative effects are, indeed, an evidence of a mean-reverting process, we should see the negative effects get stronger and more significant in subsequent years to those where the effects appeared in the previous tables.

#### 5. Robustness checks

In order to check for robustness, we decided to estimate the effect of soccer players' success on students' performance measures. The dataset used for such estimations was built with Prova Brasil's results and answers. Prova Brasil is an exam given to public schools' students alongside a survey of their socioeconomic-conditions. The exams are divided into a Mathematics and a Portuguese tests, each of them graded according to Saeb Scale<sup>12</sup>. Principals and teachers must also answer to questionnaires about the school and themselves. As mentioned before, the exams are biannually taken by all municipal, state and federal public schools with at least 20 students registered in the grades tested – the senior years of lower, middle and high school.

Data for the senior year of high school is not available for enough time. For that reason, we analyze only the lower and middle school senior years<sup>13</sup>. In Tables 8 and 9 we run similar regressions to those run before, using as dependent variables the male average performance of lower schools' senior years on, respectively, Mathematics and Portuguese standardized tests. As for the previous tables, the first regression for each period doesn't have control variables and the second controls for school and year fixed effects. The third, controls for girls' average performance on the same tests and a set of other variables<sup>14</sup>.

For both tables, we find parabolic shaped, positive and statistically significant effects in Panel A, which would mean that the success of professional players increases the schools' performance on those exams. The grades' improvement could be a result of the dropout movement: possibly to seize their competitive advantage – the soccer abilities – , less interested students dropped out, while the most diligent ones remained there, increasing the average results. However, all other measures' coefficients seem to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Saeb Scale is constructed based on the Item Response Theory. 5<sup>th</sup> grade students can score until 350 points and 9<sup>th</sup> grade students, 400 points.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> grade of lower school and 9<sup>th</sup> grade of middle school.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The controls used were: number of girls that took the test, number of men that took the test, the proportion of male students that had a TV at home, the proportion of male students that had a TV at home, the proportion of students that had a personal computer at home, average number of people the male students live with, the proportion of male students that have been encouraged by their parents, average number of hours dedicated to domestic work among male students, proportion of male students that had a job, proportion of male students whose parents were still married, proportion of male students whose parents have finished high school, dummy that turns on when the school has the habit of talking to the parents when students aren't doing well, dummy that turns on if the school hasn't received enough resources during the previous year, dummy that turns on if the school's activities have been interrupted during the previous year, dummy that turns on if the school's teachers, dummy that turns on if the school offers sport activities, dummy that turns on if the community around is engaged with the school, dummy that equals one when there have been students caught with guns during the previous year.

random, following no patterns of statistical significance, signs or growth - i.e. we see no evidence of a mean-reverting process in this case.

We believe there are two possible reasons for that lack of effects. Firstly, the grades' increase could positively affect students of lower grades, causing a peer effect that would improve performance permanently. Otherwise, the whole effects, including the professional players', could possibly be random, which would imply that soccer players' success doesn't affect the students' performance the way it is measured by Prova Brasil's results.

The results for middle schools' senior year – Tables 10 and 11 – are a bit different. Although we also find positive, parabolic shaped and statistically significant coefficients using professional players as the measure of success, the effects are not as immediate – they don't appear for the one-year measure – and significant as in Tables 8 and 9. Moreover, some of the later-success variables – precisely, playing abroad, being transferred and playing for the Brazilian national team – present immediate positive, parabolic shaped and significant effects.

These results don't fit the argument that grades increase and stay higher due to peer effects, for which we would expect positive effects only in early-success measures, such as playing professional soccer. However, the estimations suggest that performance increases even more with the later-success variables. We can't, once again, reject the null hypothesis of random effects.

With the estimations presented in Tables 8-11, we expected to check if patterns of performance were consistent with the previous tables' effects. Even though the 5<sup>th</sup> grade's coefficients fit the peer effect explanation, that doesn't apply to the 9<sup>th</sup> grade's estimations, whose students are more susceptible to dropping out. Given such results, we should be more careful when interpreting the coefficients in Tables 1-7.

#### 6. Conclusion

Recent literature has been investigating peer and role models effects, but, so far, we haven't been aware of any research focused on negative role models in education. In this work, we try to fill that gap by checking for Brazilian soccer players' impact on school engagement indicators. We opted for soccer players as role models because, besides being extremely admired by many young people, they are individuals who achieved success through a path unrelated to education. Moreover, in Brazil, most of them were raised in poor neighborhoods or slums, which makes their potential impact even greater, given that poor-background students face challenges that make them more susceptible to dropping out.

Our first findings suggest that soccer players' success temporarily increases dropout rates, especially among public and urban schools. We find positive, statistically significant and parabolic shaped effects when we consider playing as a professional player the success variable, an early-career measure. Yet, other later-success variables present also statistically significant and parabolic shaped, but negatively signed results. For that reason, we inferred there could be temporary effects: soccer players' success might first increase dropout rates but, after some time, a learning effect would bring rates back to their previous values. That is, young boys could get motivated to become soccer players after seeing a person with the same background achieve a successful soccer career, leave school, but end up not having the same opportunities. Younger students, aware of the seniors' unfortunate choices, learn that may be a bad decision and opt to remain at school, bringing dropout rates back to their initial trend.

We run another group of regressions to test how robust are our results. Using a dataset on a standardized test's performance, we estimate the relation between soccer players' success and students' grades. Unlike with the dropout rates, the estimations don't seem to fit our main argument.

In short, we find that players' success positively impacts students' grades, which could be due to peer effects: it makes sense that students who dropped out to become soccer players are less engaged in school than those that remained, which implies an increasing in average grades. However, if that was the case, we should expect the effects to stop growing at some point, and that is not what happens. Instead, they are even bigger for later success measures, such as playing for the Brazilian national team. The estimations using standardized tests' grades as dependent variable point to a lack of robustness in our results. Despite indicating that players' success increases dropout rates, they suggest no relation between the role models' achievement and students' grades. We believe there are other tests we would still have to do before coming to further conclusions, such as restricting the sample to specific grades and running the same regressions we did for the entire sample. Therefore, although we might be tempted to say soccer players' success enhances dropout rates, it is still early to assume that.

If new robustness tests come to lead us to such inference, we would recommend policy makers, teachers and principals to pay more attention to how their students respond to their role models' actions.

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	1 y	ear of suco	ess	2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ars of suce	cess	5 ye	ears of succ	288
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pan	el A: Prof	essional Pl	ayers							
Success (Professional Player)	0.0023 [0.0029]	0.0022 [0.0029]	0.0018 [0.0016]	0.0039* [0.0022]	0.00072 [0.0021]	0.0011 [0.0012]	0.0068*** [0.0018]	0.0056*** [0.0018]	0.0019* [0.0010]	0.0025 [0.0016]	0.0019 [0.0016]	-0.00013 [0.00094]	0.0013 [0.0015]	0.0020 [0.0016]	0.00077 [0.00092]
Female Dropout			0.67***			0.67***			0.67***			0.67***			0.67***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	[0.0012]		$\checkmark$	[0.0012] ✓ ✓		~	[0.0012]		$\checkmark$	[0.0012] 		$\checkmark$	[0.0012]
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465
Panel B: Playing Abroad															
Success (Playing abroad)	-0.00051 [0.0030]	0.00 <b>1</b> 3 [0.0030]	-0.0021 [0.0016]	0.00098 [0.0023]	0.00057 [0.0023]	-0.00 <b>1</b> 2 [0.0013]	-0.00066 [0.0019]	0.0014 [0.0019]	-0.00059 [0.0010]	-0.0029 [0.0018]	-0.0020 [0.0018]	-0.0014 [0.00095]	-0.0039** [0.0016]	-0.0040** [0.0017]	-0.0018* [0.00091]
Female Dropout		/	0.67*** [0.0012]		1	0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]		1	0.67*** [0.0012]		1	0.67*** [0.0012]
Controls		~	× √		~	~		v	× ✓		~	× ✓		~	× ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465
					Par	nel C: Tra	nsferred Pla	ayers							
Success (Transferred)	0.0018 [0.0029]	0.0041 [0.0028]	-0.00 <b>1</b> 5 [0.0016]	0.00 <b>1</b> 0 [0.00 <b>2</b> 2]	0.0042** [0.0021]	0.00039 [0.0012]	-0.0037** [0.0019]	0.0017 [0.0019]	0.00018 [0.0011]	-0.0083*** [0.0017]	-0.0019 [0.0017]	-0.0012 [0.00099]	-0.0097*** [0.0016]	-0.0043*** [0.0017]	-0.0013 [0.00094]
Female Dropout			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls	001105	<b>√</b>	√ √	001 105	√ 	[0.0012] ✓ ✓	00/10-	√ 	[0.0012] ✓ ✓	001105	√ 	[0.0012] ✓ ✓	001105	√ 001.105	(0.0012)
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465

## Table 1(a): Effect of Players' Success on Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 y	rear of succ	ess	2 ye	ears of suc	cess	3 ye	ears of suce	cess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Panel	l D: Trans	ferred for n	nore than	6 million a	lollars						
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	-0.015*** [0.0043]	-0.011*** [0.0041]	-0.0049** [0.0024]	-0.014*** [0.0034]	-0.012*** [0.0033]	-0.0054*** [0.0018]	-0.014*** [0.0030]	-0.012*** [0.0030]	-0.0035** [0.0016]	-0.014*** [0.0028]	-0.0085*** [0.0029]	-0.00096 [0.0016]	-0.015*** [0.0028]	-0.0055* [0.0029]	-0.00060 [0.0016]
Female Dropout			0.67***			0.67***			0.67***			0.67***			0.67***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations	984,120	√ 984,120	[0.0012]	984,120	✓ 984,120	[0.0012]	984,120	✓ 984,120	[0.0012]	984,120	√ 984,120	[0.0012]	984,120	√ 984,120	[0.0012] ✓ ✓ 553,531
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	0.093	0.093 0.083	0.076 0.465	0.093	0.093 0.083	0.076 0.466	0.093	0.093 0.083	0.076 0.465	0.093	0.093 0.083	0.076 0.465	0.093	0.093 0.083	0.076 0.465
					Pan	el E: Great	Brazilian	Team							
Success (Big Brazilian team)	0.0043 [0.0027]	-0.0011 [0.0027]	-0.0017 [0.0016]	-0.0024 [0.0020]	-0.0047** [0.0020]	-0.0022* [0.0012]	-0.0035** [0.0017]	-0.0048*** [0.0017]	-0.0020* [0.0010]	-0.0049*** [0.0016]	-0.0028* [0.0017]	-0.0021** [0.00098]	-0.0047*** [0.0015]	0.00074 [0.0016]	-0.00098 [0.00096]
Female Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	0.67*** [0.0012] √		~	0.67*** [0.0012] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.67*** [0.0012] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.67*** [0.0012] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.67*** [0.0012] ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465
					Par	nel F: Great	European	Team							
Success (Big European team)	-0.013*** [0.0047]	-0.020*** [0.0046]	-0.0089*** [0.0023]	-0.010*** [0.0036]	-0.016*** [0.0036]	-0.0061*** [0.0018]	-0.0092*** [0.0031]	-0.013*** [0.0032]	-0.0043*** [0.0016]	-0.013*** [0.0030]	-0.013*** [0.0030]	-0.0037** [0.0015]	-0.011*** [0.0028]	-0.0088*** [0.0030]	-0.0016 [0.0015]
Female Dropout			0.67*** [0.00 <b>12</b> ]			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ √		~	 ✓		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.466	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.466	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465

# Table 1(b): Effect of Players' Success on Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 y	ear of succ	288	2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of suc	cess	4 ye	ars of suc	cess	5 ye	ars of suc	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel (	G: Brazilia	n Nationa	l Team							
Success (National Team)	0.0028 [0.0032]	0.0034 [0.0032]	-0.00055 [0.0017]	-0.00098 [0.0022]	0.0027 [0.0022]	-0.00081 [0.0012]	-0.0022 [0.0019]	0.0021 [0.0019]	-0.00065 [0.00099]	-0.0065*** [0.0018]	0.0021 [0.0018]	-0.0013 [0.00095]	-0.0078*** [0.0017]	0.0033* [0.0018]	-0.00028 [0.00092]
Female Dropout			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]			0.67*** [0.0012]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	· ~ ·		$\checkmark$	· · ·		$\checkmark$	. √ √		$\checkmark$	. √ √		$\checkmark$	$\mathbf{x}$
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465	984,120 0.093	984,120 0.093 0.083	553,531 0.076 0.465

### Table 1(c): Effect of Players' Success on Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to schools' male dropout rates calculated using the Census' microdata. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all schools for which we could calculate the dropout rates.

Control variables: the numbers of overhead projectors, administrative computers, computers for students' use, employees, and dummy variables that identified if the schools have internet access and if they feed their students.

	1 y	ear of suco	ess	2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ars of suce	cess	5 ye	ars of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pan	el A: Prof	essional Pl	ayers							
Success (Professional Player)	0.0019 [0.0029]	0.0025 [0.0029]	-0.00047 [0.0016]	0.0032 [0.0021]	0.0013 [0.0021]	0.000044 [0.0012]	0.0043** [0.0017]	0.0042** [0.0018]	0.00059 [0.0010]	0.0023 [0.0015]	0.003 <b>1</b> * [0.0016]	0.0012 [0.00092]	0.0018 [0.0014]	0.0040** [0.0016]	0.0014 [0.00090]
Male Dropout			0.64***			0.64***			0.64***			0.64***			0.64***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	[0.0011]		$\checkmark$	[0.0011] ✓ ✓		$\checkmark$	[0.0011]		$\checkmark$	[0.0011]		$\checkmark$	[0.0011]
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462
					P	anel B: Pl	aying Abro	oad							
Success (Playing abroad)	0.000088 [0.0030]	0.002 <b>1</b> [0.0030]	0.0015 [0.0016]	-0.00010 [0.0023]	-0.000033 [0.0023]	0.00016 [0.0012]	-0.0023 [0.0019]	0.000089 [0.0019]	0.00048 [0.00100]	-0.0035** [0.0017]	-0.0019 [0.0018]	0.00049 [0.00093]	-0.0040** [0.0016]	-0.0031* [0.0017]	0.00065 [0.00088]
Male Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year)		<b>√</b>	0.64*** [0.0011] √		<b>√</b>	0.64*** [0.0011] √		$\checkmark$	0.64*** [0.0011] √		$\checkmark$	0.64*** [0.0011] √		$\checkmark$	0.64*** [0.0011] √
Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462
					Par	nel C: Trai	nsferred Pla	iyers							
Success (Transferred)	0.000 <b>1</b> 3 [0.0029]	0.0027 [0.0028]	0.00080 [0.0016]	0.00034 [0.0021]	0.0037* [0.0021]	0.00013 [0.0012]	-0.0050*** [0.0018]	0.00035 [0.0019]	-0.00037 [0.0010]	-0.0081*** [0.0017]	-0.0015 [0.0018]	-0.00023 [0.00097]	-0.0090*** [0.0016]	-0.0032* [0.0017]	-0.00036 [0.00092]
Male Dropout			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64*** [0.0011]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls	077.024	√ 077.024		077.024	√ 077.024		077.004	√ 077.024		077 024	√ 077.024		077.024	√ 077.024	
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	0.085	0.085 0.066	0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	0.085 0.066	0.068 0.462	0.085	0.085 0.066	0.068 0.462	0.085	0.085 0.066	0.068 0.462	0.085	0.085 0.066	0.068 0.462

Table 2(a): Effect of Play	vers' Success on Schools'	Female Dropout Rates	(School Census)
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	1 y	ear of suco	ess	2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 уе	ars of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Panel	D: Transf	erred for n	ore than (	5 million d	ollars						
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	-0.011*** [0.0043]	-0.0072* [0.0042]	0.0010 [0.0023]	-0.012*** [0.0034]	-0.0100*** [0.0034]	-0.000026 [0.0018]	-0.013*** [0.0030]	-0.011*** [0.0030]	-0.00100 [0.0016]	-0.014*** [0.0028]	-0.0089*** [0.0029]	-0.0031** [0.0015]	-0.016*** [0.0028]	-0.0073** [0.0029]	-0.0032** [0.0015]
Male Dropout			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64*** [0.00 <b>11</b> ]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		~	$\checkmark$		~	<b>\$</b>		~	<b>v</b>		~	$\checkmark$		~	$\checkmark$
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462
Panel E: Great Brazilian Team															
Success (Big Brazilian team)	0.0009 <b>1</b> [0.0027]	-0.0030 [0.0027]	0.0014 [0.0016]	-0.0036* [0.0020]	-0.0045** [0.0020]	0.00033 [0.0012]	-0.0035** [0.0017]	-0.0033* [0.0017]	0.00060 [0.0010]	-0.0040** [0.0016]	-0.00070 [0.0017]	0.0013 [0.00095]	-0.0046*** [0.0015]	0.0019 [0.0016]	0.0015 [0.00093]
Male Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year)		<b>√</b>	0.64*** [0.0011] √		$\checkmark$	0.64*** [0.0011] √		$\checkmark$	0.64*** [0.0011] √		$\checkmark$	0.64*** [0.0011] √		$\checkmark$	0.64*** [0.0011] √
Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	√ 553,531 0.068 0.462
					Pan	el F: Great	European	Team							
Success (Big European team)	-0.010** [0.0047]	-0.015*** [0.0046]	0.000032 [0.0023]	-0.0082** [0.0036]	-0.013*** [0.0036]	-0.00045 [0.0018]	-0.0088*** [0.0031]	-0.011*** [0.0032]	-0.0012 [0.0016]	-0.013*** [0.0029]	-0.012*** [0.0030]	-0.0024 [0.0015]	-0.012*** [0.0028]	-0.0086*** [0.0030]	-0.0018 [0.0015]
Male Dropout			0.64*** [0.00 <b>11</b> ]			0.64*** [0.00 <b>11</b> ]			0.64*** [0.00 <b>11</b> ]			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64*** [0.00 <b>11</b> ]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462

## Table 2(b): Effect of Players' Success on Schools' Female Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 y	ear of succ	ess	2 y	ears of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of suc	cess	4 ye	ears of suc	cess	5 ye	ears of suce	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel (	G: Brazilia	n Nationa	l Team							
Success (National Team)	0.0066** [0.0032]	0.0081** [0.0032]	0.0035** [0.0016]	0.0016 [0.0022]	0.0058*** [0.0022]	0.0028** [0.0011]	-0.00081 [0.0019]	0.0037* [0.0019]	0.0012 [0.00097]	-0.0041** [0.0018]	0.0044** [0.0019]	0.0012 [0.00093]	-0.0060*** [0.0017]	0.0048*** [0.0018]	0.00094 [0.00090]
Male Dropout			0.64*** [0.0011]			0.64***			0.64***			0.64***			0.64***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		1	1		1	4		~	4		~	4		~	1
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462	977,024 0.085	977,024 0.085 0.066	553,531 0.068 0.462

### Table 2(c): Effect of Players' Success on Schools' Female Dropout Rates (School Census)

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to schools' female dropout rates calculated using the Census' microdata. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all schools for which we could calculate the dropout rates.

Control variables: the numbers of overhead projectors, administrative computers, computers for students' use, employees, and dummy variables that identified if the schools have internet access and if they feed their students.

	1 y	ear of succe	288	2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 y	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of suc	cess	5 y	ears of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pan	el A: Profe	essional Pl	ayers							
Success (Professional Player)	0.0020 [0.0033]	0.0016 [0.0032]	0.0015 [0.0017]	0.0046* [0.0024]	0.00027 [0.0024]	0.00064 [0.0013]	0.0080*** [0.0020]	0.0062*** [0.0020]	0.0025** [0.0011]	0.0039** [0.0017]	0.0029 [0.0018]	0.00066 [0.00099]	0.0016 [0.0016]	0.0020 [0.0017]	0.0014 [0.00097]
Female Dropout			0.71*** [0.00 <b>1</b> 3]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495
					P	anel B: Pla	aying Abr	oad							
Success (Playing abroad)	0.0008 <b>1</b> [0.0034]	0.0025 [0.0033]	-0.0015 [0.0017]	0.0023 [0.0026]	0.0017 [0.0026]	-0.0011 [0.0013]	-0.0011 [0.0021]	0.0012 [0.0021]	-0.0011 [0.0011]	-0.0032 [0.0020]	-0.0022 [0.0020]	-0.0015 [0.00099]	-0.0051*** [0.0018]	-0.0052*** [0.0019]	-0.0025*** [0.00094]
Female Dropout			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		√ ∧	V V	0/0/11	√ ∧		0/0/11	√ 	V V	262.614	√ 	V V	0/0/11	√ 	V V
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495
					Par	nel C: Trar	isferred Pl	ayers							
Success (Transferred)	0.0024	0.0057*	-0.0015	0.00028	0.0045*	-0.00028	-0.0052**	0.0016	-0.00063	-	-0.0015	-0.0011	-0.012***	-0.0047**	-0.0020**
	[0.0032]	[0.0031]	[0.0017]	[0.0024]	[0.0023]	[0.0013]	[0.0021]	[0.0021]	[0.0011]	[0.0098***	[0.0019]	[0.0010]	[0.0018]	[0.0019]	[0.00099]
Female Dropout			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	<ul><li>✓</li><li>✓</li></ul>		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495

## Table 3(a): Effect of Players' Success on Public Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 y	ear of succ	ess	2 ye	ears of suc	cess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Pane	l D: Transj	ferred for n	nore than	6 million a	lollars						
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	-0.018*** [0.0048]	-0.011** [0.0046]	-0.0051** [0.0025]	-0.017*** [0.0038]	-0.013*** [0.0037]	-0.0059*** [0.0019]	-0.016*** [0.0034]	-0.013*** [0.0034]	-0.0035** [0.0017]	-0.016*** [0.0032]	-0.0094*** [0.0033]	-0.0016 [0.0017]	-0.018*** [0.0032]	-0.0075** [0.0033]	-0.0026 [0.0017]
Female Dropout			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	869,644 0.097	√ 869,644 0.097 0.091	√ √ 462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	√ 869,644 0.097 0.092	√ √ 462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	✓ 869,644 0.097 0.092	√ √ 462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	✓ 869,644 0.097 0.091	√ √ 462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	✓ 869,644 0.097 0.091	√ √ 462,910 0.080 0.495
					Pan	el E: Great	Brazilian	Team							
Success (Big Brazilian team)	0.0048 [0.0030]	-0.0025 [0.0029]	-0.0017 [0.0017]	-0.0029 [0.0022]	-0.0065*** [0.0022]	-0.0032** [0.0012]	-0.0040** [0.0019]	-0.0061*** [0.0019]	-0.0023** [0.0011]	-0.0050*** [0.0018]	-0.0034* [0.0018]	-0.0020* [0.0010]	-0.0048*** [0.0017]	0.00060 [0.0018]	-0.00094 [0.0010]
Female Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		1	0.71*** [0.0013] ✓		1	0.71*** [0.0013] ✓		~	0.71*** [0.0013] 		$\checkmark$	0.71*** [0.0013] √		$\checkmark$	0.71*** [0.0013]
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495
					Par	iel F: Great	European	Team							
Success (Big European team)	-0.015*** [0.0054]	-0.022*** [0.0052]	-0.0090*** [0.0024]	-0.010** [0.0041]	-0.016*** [0.0040]	-0.0059*** [0.0019]	-0.0096*** [0.0035]	-0.013*** [0.0035]	-0.0039** [0.0017]	-0.014*** [0.0033]	-0.013*** [0.0034]	-0.0034** [0.0016]	-0.013*** [0.0032]	-0.011*** [0.0033]	-0.0026* [0.0015]
Female Dropout			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations	869.644	√ 869.644	√ √ 462.910	869.644	√ 869.644	√ √ 462.910	869.644	√ 869.644	√ √ 462.910	869.644	√ 869.644	√ √ 462.910	869.644	√ 869.644	√ √ 462.910
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	0.097	0.097	0.080 0.495	0.097	0.097 0.092	0.080 0.495	0.097	0.097 0.092	0.080 0.495	0.097	0.097 0.092	0.080 0.495	0.097	0.097 0.092	0.080 0.495

# Table 3(b): Effect of Players' Success on Public Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 y	ear of suco	ess	2 ye	ears of suce	cess	3 ye	ears of suce	cess	4 y	ears of suc	cess	5 ye	ears of suc	cess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel (	G: Brazilia	n Nationa	l Team							
Success (National Team)	0.0040 [0.0037]	0.0035 [0.0036]	0.00042 [0.0018]	-0.00030 [0.0026]	0.0030 [0.0025]	-0.00011 [0.0012]	-0.00059 [0.0022]	0.0033 [0.0022]	0.00016 [0.0011]	-0.0048** [0.0020]	0.0042** [0.0021]	-0.00026 [0.0010]	-0.0070*** [0.0019]	0.0046** [0.0020]	0.00026 [0.00098]
Female Dropout			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]			0.71*** [0.0013]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	4		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,644 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495	869,6 <b>4</b> 4 0.097	869,644 0.097 0.091	462,910 0.080 0.495

### Table 3(c): Effect of Players' Success on Public Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to public schools' male dropout rates calculated using the Census' microdata. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all public schools for which we could calculate the dropout rates.

Control variables: the numbers of overhead projectors, administrative computers, computers for students' use, employees, and dummy variables that identified if the schools have internet access and if they feed their students.

	1 ye	ear of succ	288	2 ye	ars of succ	ess	3 уе	ars of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pan	el A: Profe	essional Pl	ayers							
Success (Professional Player)	0.0065 [0.0059]	0.0040 [0.0060]	0.0024 [0.0044]	0.0035 [0.0044]	0.0017 [0.0045]	0.0017 [0.0034]	0.0035 [0.0036]	0.0016 [0.0038]	-0.0012 [0.0028]	-0.0012 [0.0032]	-0.0041 [0.0034]	-0.0041 [0.0026]	0.0031 [0.0029]	0.00097 [0.0033]	-0.0022 [0.0025]
Female Dropout			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]
Fixed Effects (School and Year)		$\checkmark$	~		$\checkmark$	~		$\checkmark$	~		$\checkmark$	1		$\checkmark$	1
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389									
					P	anel B: Pla	aying Abro	oad							
Success (Playing abroad)	-0.0038 [0.0061]	-0.0071 [0.0062]	-0.0054 [0.0046]	-0.0021 [0.0047]	-0.0063 [0.0048]	-0.0017 [0.0036]	0.0044 [0.0037]	0.0016 [0.0039]	0.0014 [0.0029]	0.0015 [0.0034]	-0.0014 [0.0036]	-0.00 <b>11</b> [0.0027]	0.0046 [0.0032]	0.0020 [0.0034]	0.0016 [0.0026]
Female Dropout		/	0.58*** [0.0027]		/	0.58*** [0.0027]									
Controls		*	× ✓		×	× ✓		×	× ✓		*	× ✓		v	× ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389									
					Par	nel C: Tran	sferred Pla	iyers							
Success (Transferred)	0.00013 [0.0063]	-0.0038 [0.0063]	-0.0017 [0.0048]	0.0071 [0.0047]	0.0043 [0.0048]	0.0036 [0.0036]	0.0066* [0.0039]	0.0042 [0.0041]	0.0038 [0.0031]	0.0022 [0.0036]	-0.00034 [0.0038]	-0.0011 [0.0028]	0.0050 [0.0033]	0.0022 [0.0035]	0.0020 [0.0026]
Female Dropout			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	<b>\$</b>		$\checkmark$	√ ✓		$\checkmark$	√ ✓		$\checkmark$	<b>v</b>		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389									

## Table 4(a): Effect of Players' Success on Private Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

1 y	ear of suco	288	2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
			Panel	D: Transf	erred for n	nore than (	5 million d	lollars						
0.0053 [0.0088]	-0.0011 [0.0088]	-0.0040 [0.0064]	0.00049 [0.0065]	-0.0027 [0.0067]	-0.0033 [0.0048]	-0.00067 [0.0056]	-0.0023 [0.0058]	-0.0029 [0.0042]	-0.0017 [0.0052]	0.00040 [0.0056]	0.0013 [0.0040]	0.00033 [0.0051]	0.0071 [0.0056]	0.0061 [0.0041]
		0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]
114,476 0.060	✓ 114,476 0.060 0.031	√ 90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	✓ 114,476 0.060 0.031	√ 90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	✓ 114,476 0.060 0.031	√ 90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	√ 114,476 0.060 0.031	✓ 90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	✓ 114,476 0.060 0.031	√ 90,621 0.053 0.389
				Pane	el E: Great	Brazilian	Team							
0.0028 [0.0059]	0.0019 [0.0059]	-0.0021 [0.0044]	0.0015 [0.0044]	0.0027 [0.0045]	0.0013 [0.0033]	0.00044 [0.0038]	0.0011 [0.0039]	-0.00029 [0.0029]	-0.0023 [0.0034]	-0.0015 [0.0037]	-0.0024 [0.0027]	-0.0022 [0.0033]	-0.00069 [0.0036]	-0.0012 [0.0026]
	~	0.58*** [0.0027] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.58*** [0.0027] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.58*** [0.0027] √		$\checkmark$	0.58*** [0.0027] √		$\checkmark$	0.58*** [0.0027]
114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389
				Pan	el F: Great	European	Team							
0.00090 [0.0091]	-0.0073 [0.0091]	-0.0078 [0.0066]	-0.006 <b>1</b> [0.0070]	-0.012* [0.0071]	-0.0072 [0.0051]	-0.0046 [0.0061]	-0.0093 [0.0064]	-0.0055 [0.0046]	-0.0069 [0.0058]	-0.0094 [0.0062]	-0.0046 [0.0044]	0.00 <b>1</b> 2 [0.0055]	0.0032 [0.0061]	0.0038 [0.0044]
		0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]
114,476 0.060	✓ 114,476 0.060	√ 90,621 0.053	114,476 0.060	✓ 114,476 0.060	√ 90,621 0.053	114,476 0.060	✓ 114,476 0.060	√ 90,621 0.053	114,476 0.060	✓ 114,476 0.060	√ 90,621 0.053	114,476 0.060	✓ 114,476 0.060	√ √ 90,621 0.053
	1 y (1) 0.0053 [0.0088] 114,476 0.060 0.0059] 114,476 0.060 0.0090 [0.0091] 0.00090 [0.0091]	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c } \hline 1 & year of success \\ \hline (1) & (2) & (3) \\ \hline (0.0053 & -0.0011 & -0.0040 \\ [0.0088] & [0.0088] & [0.0064] \\ 0.0088] & [0.0088] & [0.0027] \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & &$	$\begin{array}{c cccc} 1 \text{ year of success} & 2 \text{ year of } \\ \hline (1) & (2) & (3) & \hline (4) & \hline \\ \hline \\ \hline \\ 0.0053 & -0.0011 & -0.0040 & 0.00049 \\ \hline \\ 0.0088 & [0.0088] & [0.0064] & [0.0065] & \hline \\ 0.088 & [0.0027] & \checkmark & \checkmark & \hline \\ 114,476 & 114,476 & 90,621 & 114,476 \\ 0.060 & 0.060 & 0.053 & 0.060 \\ \hline \\ 0.0028 & 0.0019 & -0.0021 & 0.0015 \\ \hline \\ 0.0029 & [0.0059] & [0.0044] & [0.0015 \\ \hline \\ 0.0059 & [0.0059] & [0.0044] & [0.0044] \\ \hline \\ 0.58^{***} & [0.0027] & \checkmark & \checkmark & \hline \\ 114,476 & 114,476 & 90,621 & 114,476 \\ 0.060 & 0.060 & 0.053 & 0.060 \\ \hline \\ 0.00090 & -0.0073 & -0.0078 & -0.0061 \\ \hline \\ 0.00091 & [0.0091] & [0.0086] & [0.0070] & \hline \\ 0.58^{***} & [0.0027] & \checkmark & \checkmark & \checkmark & \hline \\ 114,476 & 114,476 & 90,621 & 114,476 \\ 0.060 & 0.060 & 0.053 & 0.060 \\ \hline \\ 114,476 & 114,476 & 90,621 & 114,476 \\ 0.060 & 0.060 & 0.053 & 0.060 \\ \hline \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c ccccc} 1 \ year \ of success \\ \hline \hline (1) \ (2) \ (3) \ \hline \hline \\ \hline \\ Panel \ D: \ Transf$	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$

## Table 4(b): Effect of Players' Success on Private Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 y	ear of succ	288	2 ye	ars of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of suce	cess	5 ye	ars of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel (	G: Brazilia	n Nationa	l Team							
Success (National Team)	0.0011 [0.0061]	0.00 <b>1</b> 0 [0.0061]	-0.0035 [0.0045]	-0.00044 [0.0041]	0.00072 [0.0042]	-0.0030 [0.0030]	-0.0046 [0.0034]	-0.0035 [0.0036]	-0.0036 [0.0026]	-0.0085*** [0.0031]	-0.0071** [0.0034]	-0.0050** [0.0025]	-0.0066** [0.0029]	-0.0043 [0.0033]	-0.0024 [0.0024]
Female Dropout			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]			0.58*** [0.0027]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	√ ✓		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	4
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389	114,476 0.060	114,476 0.060 0.031	90,621 0.053 0.389

### Table 4(c): Effect of Players' Success on Private Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to schools' male dropout rates calculated using the Census' microdata for private schools. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all private schools for which we could calculate the dropout rates.

Control variables: the numbers of overhead projectors, administrative computers, computers for students' use, employees, and dummy variables that identified if the schools have internet access and if they feed their students.

	1 ye	ear of succ	288	2 ye	ars of succ	ess	3 ye	ars of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pan	el A: Profe	essional Pla	ayers							
Success (Professional Player)	-0.0028 [0.0079]	0.00062 [0.0077]	0.0017 [0.0087]	0.00064 [0.0055]	-0.0053 [0.0054]	-0.0023 [0.0063]	0.0072 [0.0045]	0.0050 [0.0046]	0.0060 [0.0049]	-0.00023 [0.0038]	-0.0036 [0.0040]	-0.0029 [0.0042]	-0.0037 [0.0035]	-0.0057 [0.0037]	0.00 <b>11</b> [0.0040]
Female Dropout			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282
					P	anel B: Pla	aying Abro	oad							
Success (Playing abroad)	0.0087 [0.0088]	0.0026 [0.0086]	0.0036 [0.0072]	0.0075 [0.0063]	-0.0032 [0.0063]	-0.00087 [0.0054]	0.0019 [0.0055]	-0.0017 [0.0056]	0.0052 [0.0049]	-0.0051 [0.0051]	-0.0042 [0.0054]	0.00050 [0.0045]	-0.011** [0.0048]	-0.0054 [0.0053]	-0.0056 [0.0045]
Female Dropout			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	<b>1</b>		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	√ √
Observations Dep. Var. Mean	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107	127,017 0.075	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107	127,017 0.075	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107	127,017 0.075	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107	127,017 0.075	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107	127,017 0.075
$\mathbb{R}^2$		0.095	0.282		0.095	0.282		0.095	0.282		0.095	0.282		0.095	0.282
					Par	nel C: Trar	isferred Pla	yers							
Success (Transferred)	0.0017	0.015**	0.0068	-0.0037	0.0081	0.0053	-0.015***	0.0036	0.0045	-0.025***	0.0029	-0.0019	-0.029***	0.0022	-0.0021
Female Dropout	[0.0000]	[0.0000]	0.49***	[0.0000]	[0.0000]	0.49***	[0.0040]	[0.00±0]	0.49***	[0.0041]	[0.0040]	0.49***	[0.0040]	[0.0011]	0.49***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	[0.0035] ✓		$\checkmark$	[0.0055] ✓		$\checkmark$	[0.0033] ✓		$\checkmark$	[0.0055] √		$\checkmark$	[0.0055] ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282

# Table 5(a): Effect of Players' Success on Rural Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 y	ear of suco	288	2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Panel	D: Transf	erred for n	nore than	6 million a	lollars						
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	-0.040*** [0.010]	0.0024 [0.0097]	-0.0053 [0.011]	-0.035*** [0.0092]	0.0062 [0.0089]	0.0033 [0.0091]	-0.040*** [0.0086]	-0.0027 [0.0085]	0.0051 [0.0083]	-0.032*** [0.0084]	0.0041 [0.0084]	0.0077 [0.0082]	-0.031*** [0.0082]	0.0063 [0.0084]	0.0018 [0.0080]
Female Dropout			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	447,593 0.107	✓ 447,593 0.107 0.095	√ √ 127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	√ 447,593 0.107 0.095	√ √ 127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	✓ 447,593 0.107 0.095	√ √ 127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	✓ 447,593 0.107 0.095	√ √ 127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	✓ 447,593 0.107 0.095	√ √ 127,017 0.075 0.282
					Pano	el E: Great	Brazilian	Team							
Success (Big Brazilian team)	0.0 <b>11</b> * [0.0060]	-0.0051 [0.0059]	-0.0046 [0.0078]	-0.0042 [0.0045]	-0.0 <b>11</b> ** [0.0044]	-0.00046 [0.0052]	-0.0075* [0.0039]	-0.0097** [0.0040]	-0.00084 [0.0046]	-0.010*** [0.0036]	-0.0048 [0.0039]	0.00079 [0.0043]	-0.013*** [0.0035]	-0.00079 [0.0039]	-0.00045 [0.0043]
Female Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	0.49*** [0.0033] √		√	0.49*** [0.0033] ✓		√	0.49*** [0.0033] √		√	0.49*** [0.0033] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.49*** [0.0033] ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282
					Pan	el F: Great	European	Team							
Success (Big European team)	-0.036* [0.019]	-0.029 [0.018]	-0.0070 [0.010]	-0.031** [0.014]	-0.019 [0.014]	-0.0022 [0.0086]	-0.036*** [0.012]	-0.024* [0.013]	-0.0072 [0.0081]	-0.054*** [0.011]	-0.037*** [0.013]	-0.022*** [0.0082]	-0.055*** [0.011]	-0.037*** [0.013]	-0.022** [0.0085]
Female Dropout			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations	447,593	√ 447,593	127,017	447,593	√ 447,593	127,017	447,593	√ 447,593	127,017	447,593	√ 447,593	127,017	447,593	√ 447,593	127,017
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	0.107	0.107 0.095	0.075 0.282	0.107	0.107 0.095	0.075 0.282	0.107	0.107 0.095	0.075 0.282	0.107	0.107 0.095	0.075 0.282	0.107	0.107 0.095	0.075 0.282

# Table 5(b): Effect of Players' Success on Rural Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 ye	ear of succe	ess	2 ye	ars of suc	cess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ars of succ	ess	5 ye	ars of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel (	G: Brazilian	n Nationa	l Team							
Success (National Team)	0.0010 [0.012]	0.0067 [0.011]	0.0024 [0.0091]	-0.010 [0.0085]	0.0017 [0.0085]	-0.000055 [0.0065]	-0.015** [0.0074]	-0.00045 [0.0078]	-0.0046 [0.0061]	-0.026*** [0.0069]	-0.0022 [0.0076]	-0.0024 [0.0063]	-0.029*** [0.0068]	0.0035 [0.0078]	0.00095 [0.0071]
Female Dropout			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]			0.49*** [0.0033]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	· · · · ·		$\checkmark$	√ ✓		$\checkmark$	· · ·		$\checkmark$	· · ·		$\checkmark$	_ √ _ √
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282	447,593 0.107	447,593 0.107 0.095	127,017 0.075 0.282

### Table 5(c): Effect of Players' Success on Rural Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to rural schools' male dropout rates calculated using the Census' microdata. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all rural schools for which we could calculate the dropout rates.

Control variables: the numbers of overhead projectors, administrative computers, computers for students' use, employees, and dummy variables that identified if the schools have internet access and if they feed their students.

	1 y	ear of succe	ss	2 ye	ars of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	cess	4 ye	ears of succ	cess	5 y	ears of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pane	el A: Profe	essional Pl	ayers							
Success (Professional Player)	0.0045** [0.0022]	0.0043** [0.0022]	0.0017 [0.0015]	0.0060*** [0.0017]	0.0040** [0.0016]	0.0013 [0.0012]	0.0076*** [0.0014]	0.0064*** [0.0014]	0.0014 [0.00098]	0.0042*** [0.0012]	0.0036*** [0.0013]	0.000020 [0.00090]	0.0041*** [0.0012]	0.0040*** [0.0012]	0.00059 [0.00089]
Female Dropout			0.72***			0.72***			0.72***			0.72***			0.72***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations	534,959	√ 534.959	[0.0012] 426.514	534,959	√ 534,959	[0.0012] 426.514	534,959	√ 534.959	[0.0012] 426.514	534.959	√ 534.959	[0.0012] 426.514	534.959	√ 534.959	[0.0012] 426.514
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527
					Pa	unel B: Pla	aying Abr	oad							
Success (Playing abroad)	-0.0025 [0.0023]	-0.0012 [0.0022]	-0.0027* [0.0015]	-0.00074 [0.0018]	-0.0010 [0.0017]	-0.0013 [0.0012]	-0.00092 [0.0014]	-0.00015 [0.0014]	-0.0011 [0.00097]	-0.0017 [0.0013]	-0.0025* [0.0013]	-0.0015* [0.00091]	-0.0012 [0.0012]	-0.0034*** [0.0012]	-0.0015* [0.00086]
Female Dropout			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ √		~	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527
					Par	iel C: Tran	isferred Pl	iyers							
Success (Transferred)	0.0014	0.000064	-0.0024	0.0024	0.0022	-0.00017	0.00057	0.00096	-0.00031	-0.0015	-0.0018	-0.0011	-0.0022*	- 0.0037***	-0.0012
	[0.0023]	[0.0022]	[0.0016]	[0.0017]	[0.0017]	[0.0012]	[0.0015]	[0.0015]	[0.0010]	[0.0014]	[0.0013]	[0.00096]	[0.0013]	[0.0013]	[0.00090]
Female Dropout			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]		-	0.72*** [0.0012]		.(	0.72*** [0.0012]
Controls		×	× ✓		v	× ✓		v	× •		v	× ✓		×	× •
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527

# Table 6(a): Effect of Players' Success on Urban Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

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	1 y	ear of succ	ess	2 ye	ars of succ	cess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Panel	D: Transf	ferred for n	ore than	6 million d	lollars						
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	-0.0033 [0.0034]	-0.0082** [0.0033]	-0.0048** [0.0023]	-0.0060** [0.0026]	-0.011*** [0.0025]	-0.0057*** [0.0017]	-0.0050** [0.0023]	-0.0088*** [0.0022]	-0.0038** [0.0015]	-0.0067*** [0.0021]	-0.0069*** [0.0021]	-0.0012 [0.0015]	-0.0081*** [0.0021]	-0.0050** [0.0021]	-0.00045 [0.0015]
Female Dropout			0.72***			0.72***			0.72***			0.72***			0.72***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations	534.959	√ 534.959	[0.0012] √ 426.514	534,959	√ 534.959	[0.0012] √ 426.514	534.959	√ 534.959	[0.0012] √ 426.514	534.959	√ 534.959	[0.0012] √ 426.514	534.959	√ 534.959	[0.0012] ✓ ✓ 426.514
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527	0.081	0.081 0.094	0.076 0.527
					Pan	el E: Great	Brazilian	Team							
Success (Big Brazilian team)	0.00084 [0.0023]	-0.00097 [0.0022]	-0.0016 [0.0015]	-0.0016 [0.0017]	-0.0025 [0.0016]	-0.0026** [0.0011]	-0.0016 [0.0014]	-0.0028** [0.0014]	-0.0022** [0.0010]	-0.0023* [0.0013]	-0.0022* [0.0013]	-0.0024** [0.00094]	-0.00022 [0.0013]	0.0012 [0.0013]	-0.0011 [0.00092]
Female Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year)		~	0.72*** [0.0012] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.72*** [0.0012] ✓		1	0.72*** [0.0012] √		$\checkmark$	0.72*** [0.0012] √		V	0.72*** [0.0012]
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527
					Pan	el F: Great	European	Team							
Success (Big European team)	-0.0085** [0.0034]	-0.015*** [0.0032]	-0.0090*** [0.0022]	-0.0057** [0.0026]	-0.012*** [0.0025]	-0.0061*** [0.0017]	-0.0039* [0.0023]	-0.0084*** [0.0022]	-0.0040*** [0.0015]	-0.0057*** [0.0021]	-0.0073*** [0.0021]	-0.0024* [0.0015]	-0.0033 [0.0020]	-0.0036* [0.0021]	-0.00047 [0.0014]
Female Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year)		1	0.72*** [0.0012]		<u>_</u>	0.72*** [0.0012]		<i>√</i>	0.72*** [0.0012]		<b>√</b>	0.72*** [0.0012]		1	0.72*** [0.0012]
Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	√ 426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	√ 426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	√ 426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	√ 426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	√ 426,514 0.076 0.527

# Table 6(b): Effect of Players' Success on Urban Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 ye	ear of succe	ss	2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 уе	ars of succ	ess	4 ye	ars of succ	cess	5 ye	ars of succ	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel C	G: Brazilia	n Nationa	l Team							
Success (National Team)	0.0046** [0.0023]	0.0036 [0.0022]	-0.0012 [0.0016]	0.00 <b>1</b> 7 [0.00 <b>1</b> 6]	0.0032** [0.0016]	-0.0013 [0.0011]	0.0010 [0.0014]	0.0025* [0.0013]	-0.00065 [0.00093]	-0.0024* [0.0013]	0.0014 [0.0013]	-0.0014 [0.00089]	-0.0035*** [0.0012]	0.0014 [0.0012]	-0.00059 [0.00086]
Female Dropout			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]			0.72*** [0.0012]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	. √ . √		$\checkmark$	· · ·		$\checkmark$	$\mathbf{x}$		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	$\mathbf{x}$
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527	534,959 0.081	534,959 0.081 0.094	426,514 0.076 0.527

### Table 6(c): Effect of Players' Success on Urban Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to urban schools' male dropout rates calculated using the Census' microdata. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all urban schools for which we could calculate the dropout rates.

Control variables: the numbers of overhead projectors, administrative computers, computers for students' use, employees, and dummy variables that identified if the schools have internet access and if they feed their students.

	1 y	ear of succe	ess	2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 y	ears of suce	cess	4 y	ears of suc	cess	5 y	ears of suc	cess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pan	el A: Profe	essional Pl	ayers							
Success (Professional Player)	0.0042* [0.0024]	0.0043* [0.0023]	0.0014 [0.0015]	0.0069*** [0.0018]	0.0046*** [0.0017]	0.00074 [0.0011]	0.0089*** [0.0015]	0.0078*** [0.0014]	0.0017* [0.00095]	0.0061*** [0.0013]	0.0059*** [0.0013]	0.00081 [0.00088]	0.0046*** [0.0013]	0.0049*** [0.0013]	0.0013 [0.00087]
Female Dropout			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]		.(	0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]
Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	423,390 0.087	¥ 423,390 0.087 0.124	√ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	¥ 423,390 0.087 0.124	√ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	¥ 423,390 0.087 0.124	✓ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	¥ 423,390 0.087 0.124	✓ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	¥ 423,390 0.087 0.124	√ 336,767 0.082 0.605
					P	anel B: Pla	aying Abr	oad							
Success (Playing abroad)	-0.0017 [0.0024]	0.000088 [0.0023]	-0.0022 [0.0015]	0.000013 [0.0019]	0.00035 [0.0018]	-0.0013 [0.0012]	-0.0023 [0.0015]	-0.00074 [0.0015]	-0.0018* [0.00094]	-0.0024* [0.0014]	-0.0029** [0.0014]	-0.0016* [0.00087]	-0.0029** [0.0013]	-0.0049*** [0.0013]	-0.0022*** [0.00083]
Female Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	423,390 0.087	✓ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	✓ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	✓ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	✓ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	✓ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ 336,767 0.082 0.605
					Par	nel C: Tran	nsferred Pl	ayers							
Success (Transferred)	0.0018	0.0011	-0.0026* [0.0015]	0.0013	0.0018 [0.0018]	-0.0010 [0.0011]	-0.0012 [0.0016]	0.00021	-0.0013	-0.0026* [0.0015]	-0.0021 [0.0014]	-0.00086	- 0.0044*** [0.0014]	- 0.0052*** [0.0013]	-0.0019**
Female Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087 0.124	0.80*** [0.0013] 336,767 0.082 0.605

# Table 7(a): Effect of Players' Success on Public and Urban Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 y	ear of suco	ess	2 ye	ears of suce	cess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of suco	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Panel	D: Transj	ferred for m	ore than	6 million a	lollars						
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	-0.0063* [0.0037]	-0.0098*** [0.0035]	-0.0051** [0.0022]	-0.0084*** [0.0028]	-0.013*** [0.0027]	-0.0062*** [0.0017]	-0.0069*** [0.0025]	-0.010*** [0.0024]	-0.0039*** [0.0015]	-0.0089*** [0.0023]	-0.0089*** [0.0023]	-0.0018 [0.0014]	-0.012*** [0.0023]	-0.0086*** [0.0023]	-0.0024 [0.0015]
Female Dropout			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087 0.124	√ √ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087 0.124	√ √ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	✓ 423,390 0.087 0.124	√ √ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	✓ 423,390 0.087 0.124	√ √ 336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	✓ 423,390 0.087 0.124	√ √ 336,767 0.082 0.605
					Pan	el E: Great	Brazilian	Team							
Success (Big Brazilian team)	0.00020 [0.0024]	-0.0020 [0.0023]	-0.0014 [0.0015]	-0.0026 [0.0018]	-0.0043** [0.0017]	-0.0036*** [0.0011]	-0.0023 [0.0015]	-0.0039*** [0.0015]	-0.0024** [0.00097]	-0.0023 [0.0014]	-0.0025* [0.0014]	-0.0022** [0.00091]	0.00027 [0.0014]	0.0014 [0.0013]	-0.00097 [0.00090]
Female Dropout Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		√	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ ✓		~	0.80*** [0.0013] </td <td></td> <td>~</td> <td>0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ ✓</td> <td></td> <td>V</td> <td>0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ ✓</td> <td></td> <td>V</td> <td>0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ ✓</td>		~	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ ✓		V	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ ✓		V	0.80*** [0.0013] ✓ ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605
					Par	iel F: Great	European	Team							
Success (Big European team)	-0.011*** [0.0036]	-0.017*** [0.0033]	-0.0090*** [0.0022]	-0.0057** [0.0027]	-0.012*** [0.0026]	-0.0058*** [0.0017]	-0.0039 [0.0024]	-0.0080*** [0.0023]	-0.0035** [0.0015]	-0.0055** [0.0023]	-0.0067*** [0.0022]	-0.0018 [0.0014]	-0.0047** [0.0022]	-0.0052** [0.0021]	-0.0012 [0.0014]
Female Dropout			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]			0.80*** [0.0013]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087	√ √ 336,767 0.082	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087	√ √ 336,767 0.082	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087	√ √ 336,767 0.082	423,390 0.087	✓ 423,390 0.087	√ √ 336,767 0.082	423,390 0.087	√ 423,390 0.087	√ √ 336,767 0.082
$R^2$	0.007	0.124	0.605	0.007	0.124	0.605	0.007	0.124	0.605	01007	0.124	0.605	0.007	0.124	0.605

# Table 7(b): Effect of Players' Success on Public and Urban Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

	1 y	1 year of success		2 ye	ears of suce	cess	3 y	ears of succ	cess	4 y	ears of suc	cess	5 y	ears of suc	cess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel (	G: Brazilia	n Nationa	al Team							
Success (National Team)	0.0058** [0.0025]	0.0042* [0.0023]	-0.00037 [0.0015]	0.0025 [0.0017]	0.0041** [0.0016]	-0.00076 [0.0011]	0.0030** [0.0015]	0.0044*** [0.0014]	0.00012 [0.00091]	-0.00011 [0.0014]	0.0040*** [0.0014]	-0.00057 [0.00088]	-0.0023* [0.0013]	0.0030** [0.0013]	-0.00024 [0.00084]
Female Dropout			0.80***			0.80***			0.80***			0.80***			0.80***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		~	1		~	4		~	5		~	1		~	4
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605	423,390 0.087	423,390 0.087 0.124	336,767 0.082 0.605

### Table 7(c): Effect of Players' Success on Public and Urban Schools' Male Dropout Rates (School Census)

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to public and urban schools' male dropout rates calculated using the Census' microdata. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all public and urban schools for which we could calculate the dropout rates.

Control variables: the numbers of overhead projectors, administrative computers, computers for students' use, employees, and dummy variables that identified if the schools have internet access and if they feed their students.

	1 year of success		2 ye	ears of suc	cess	3 y	ears of suc	cess	4 y	ears of suc	cess	5 y	ears of suc	cess	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pan	el A: Prof	essional Pl	layers							
Success (Professional Player)	3.14** [1.38]	4.60*** [1.15]	0. <b>1</b> 3 [0.50]	1.36 [1.08]	3.47*** [0.89]	0.017 [0.39]	2.11** [0.87]	2.65*** [0.73]	-0.14 [0.32]	0.22 [0.78]	1.55** [0.66]	-0.088 [0.29]	1.79** [0.74]	1.27* [0.65]	0.042 [0.28]
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year)		~	0.91*** [0.0015] √		~	0.91*** [0.0015] √		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0015] √		~	0.91*** [0.0015] ✓		~	0.91*** [0.0015] √
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 208.492	118,945 208.492 0.346	107,419 208.626 0.888												
					P	anel B: Pl	aying Abr	oad							
Success (Playing abroad)	4.60*** [1.47]	-0.17 [1.21]	0.20 [0.53]	2.73** [1.18]	-0.086 [0.97]	0.34 [0.42]	1.08 [0.89]	-0.89 [0.74]	0.22 [0.32]	-0.77 [0.81]	-1.51** [0.68]	0.23 [0.29]	-0.52 [0.77]	-1.27* [0.65]	0.22 [0.28]
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		1	0.91*** [0.0015] ✓		~	0.91*** [0.0015] ✓		~	0.91*** [0.0015] ✓		~	0.91*** [0.0015] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0015] √
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 208.492	118,945 208.492 0.346	107,419 208.626 0.888												
					Pa	nel C: Trai	nsferred Pl	ayers							
Success (Transferred)	4.19*** [1.56]	0.31 [1.28]	0.024 [0.55]	1.01 [1.15]	0.027 [0.94]	0.39 [0.41]	1.07 [0.96]	-0.66 [0.80]	0.38 [0.35]	-1.27 [0.85]	-2.15*** [0.71]	0.15 [0.31]	-0.41 [0.81]	-2.02*** [0.69]	-0.0056 [0.30]
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0015] √		V	0.91*** [0.0015] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0015] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0015] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0015] ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 208.492	118,945 208.492 0.346	107,419 208.626 0.888												

Table 8(a): Effect of Players' Success on 5th Grade Students' Performance - Prova Brasil's Mathematics Standardized Exams

	1 year of success		2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of suc	cess	4 ye	ears of suce	cess	5 ye	ears of suc	ess	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Panel	D: Transf	ferred for n	nore than	6 million a	lollars						
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	-0.24 [2.09]	0.92 [1.72]	0.80 [0.74]	-0.99 [1.75]	-0.44 [1.44]	0.28 [0.62]	1.18 [1.53]	-0.10 [1.28]	-0.045 [0.55]	2.27 [1.46]	0.19 [1.23]	0.019 [0.53]	4.34*** [1.40]	1.20 [1.21]	-0.058 [0.52]
Female Performance			0.91***			0.91***			0.91***			0.91***			0.91***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	[0.0015]												
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 208.492	118,945 208.492 0.346	107,419 208.626 0.888												
Panel E: Great Brazilian Team															
Success (Big Brazilian team)	1.52 [1.36]	2.93*** [1.12]	0.0049 [0.48]	-1.59 [1.04]	0.57 [0.86]	-0.24 [0.37]	0.55 [0.91]	0.27 [0.77]	-0.40 [0.33]	0.21 [0.81]	0.79 [0.69]	0. <b>1</b> 4 [0.30]	2.51*** [0.79]	0.57 [0.69]	0. <b>12</b> [0.30]
Female Performance			0.91*** [0.0015]												
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>~</i>		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 208.492	118,945 208.492 0.346	107,419 208.626 0.888												
					Pan	el F: Great	European	Team							
Success (Big European team)	0.16 [1.99]	-0.29 [1.64]	1.04 [0.71]	-0.21 [1.60]	0.74 [1.32]	1.06* [0.57]	2.62* [1.41]	1.63 [1.18]	0.65 [0.51]	1.28 [1.27]	1.16 [1.06]	0.42 [0.47]	1.69 [1.21]	1.50 [1.03]	0.2 <b>1</b> [0.45]
Female Performance			0.91*** [0.0015]												
Fixed Effects (School and Year)		$\checkmark$	<b>v</b>		$\checkmark$	<i>√</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 208.492	118,945 208.492 0.346	107,419 208.626 0.888												

Table 8(b): Effect of Players	' Success on 5th Grade Students'	Performance - Prova	Brasil's Mathematics	Standardized Exams
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	1 year of success		2 ye	ears of suc	cess	3 y	ears of suc	cess	4 y	ears of suc	cess	5 y	ears of suc	cess	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel	G: Brazilia	n Nationa	l Team							
Success (National Team)	1.38 [1.69]	0.072 [1.39]	0.51 [0.61]	2.98** [1.21]	1.00 [1.00]	0.27 [0.43]	3.56*** [0.97]	0.82 [0.81]	0.20 [0.36]	3.84*** [0.89]	0.39 [0.75]	0.33 [0.33]	3.66*** [0.80]	-0.24 [0.69]	0.20 [0.30]
Female Performance			0.91*** [0.0015]												
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	$\mathbf{x}$		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 208.492	118,945 208.492 0.346	107,419 208.626 0.888												

Table 8(c): Effect of Players' Success on 5th Grade Students' Performance - Prova Brasil's Mathematics Standardized Exams

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to 5th grade male students' average performance on Prova Brasil's Mathematics test. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all schools that took Prova Brasil's exams between 2007 and 2015.

Control variables: number of girls that took the test, number of men that took the test, the proportion of male students that had a TV at home, the proportion of male students that had a refrigerator at home, the proportion of students that had a personal computer at home, average number of people the male students live with, the proportion of male students that have been encouraged by their parents, average number of hours dedicated to domestic work among male students, proportion of male students that had a job, proportion of male students whose parents were still married, proportion of male students whose parents have finished high school, dummy that turns on when the school has the habit of talking to the parents when students aren't doing well, dummy that turns on if the school hasn't received enough resources during the previous year, dummy that turns on if the school's activities have been interrupted during the previous year, dummy that turns on if there is high turnover between the school's teachers, dummy that turns on if the school offers sport activities, dummy that turns on if the community around is engaged with the school, dummy that equals one when there have been students caught with drugs during the previous year, dummy that equals one when there have been students caught with guns during the previous year.

	1 year of success		2 ye	ars of succ	ess	3 уе	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	ess	5 ye	ars of suco	ess	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pano	el A: Profe	essional Pla	ayers							
Success (Professional Player)	-0.25 [1.34]	3.58*** [1.00]	0.43 [0.47]	-1.60 [1.05]	2.05*** [0.78]	0.041 [0.36]	-0.56 [0.84]	1.14* [0.64]	-0.20 [0.30]	-1.67** [0.75]	0.62 [0.58]	-0.12 [0.27]	0.44 [0.71]	0.34 [0.57]	-0.062 [0.26]
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year)		$\checkmark$	0.89*** [0.0016] √		V	0.89*** [0.0016] √		$\checkmark$	0.89*** [0.0016] √		~	0.89*** [0.0016] √		√	0.89*** [0.0016] √
Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	√ 107,419 184.972 0.898												
Panel B: Playing Abroad															
Success (Playing abroad)	5.37*** [1.42]	-0.56 [1.06]	0.050 [0.49]	2.57** [1.14]	-0.85 [0.85]	0.044 [0.39]	1.53* [0.87]	-1.39** [0.65]	-0.0027 [0.30]	-0.36 [0.78]	-1.81*** [0.59]	-0.082 [0.27]	-0.10 [0.74]	-1.26** [0.57]	-0.13 [0.26]
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls	110.045	√ 118.045	0.89*** [0.0016]	110.045	√ 118.045	0.89*** [0.0016]	110.045	√ 118.045	0.89*** [0.0016]	118.045	√ 118.045	0.89*** [0.0016]	118.045	√ 118.045	0.89*** [0.0016] √ √
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898												
					Par	iel C: Tran	sferred Pla	iyers							
Success (Transferred)	4.11*** [1.52]	0.44 [1.12]	0.054 [0.51]	0.53 [1.12]	-0.11 [0.83]	0.17 [0.38]	1.78* [0.93]	-0.54 [0.70]	0.26 [0.32]	-0.38 [0.82]	-1.64*** [0.62]	-0.072 [0.29]	0.81 [0.78]	-1.15* [0.60]	-0.16 [0.28]
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations	118,945	√ 118,945	0.89*** [0.0016] 107,419												
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	184.942	184.942 0.479	184.972 0.898												

Table 9(a): Effect of Players' Success on 5th Grade Students' Performance - Portuguese Standardized Exams - 5th grade

	1 year of success		2 ye	ars of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ars of succ	ess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Panel	D: Transf	erred for n	nore than (	5 million a	lollars						
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	1.16 [2.03]	2.43 [1.50]	0.85 [0.69]	-0.031 [1.71]	0.57 [1.26]	0.43 [0.58]	-0.38 [1.49]	-0.74 [1.12]	-0.044 [0.51]	0.70 [1.41]	-0.19 [1.07]	0.047 [0.49]	3.13** [1.35]	1.26 [1.06]	-0.084 [0.49]
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		√	0.89*** [0.0016] √		√	0.89*** [0.0016] √		V	0.89*** [0.0016] √		√	0.89*** [0.0016] √		√	0.89*** [0.0016] √
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898
Panel E: Great Brazilian Team															
Success (Big Brazilian team)	-1.34 [1.33]	1.57 [0.98]	0.21 [0.45]	-4.00*** [1.01]	-0.61 [0.75]	-0.20 [0.34]	-1.53* [0.88]	-0.86 [0.67]	-0.35 [0.31]	-1.64** [0.79]	0.00017 [0.60]	0.019 [0.28]	1.12 [0.76]	-0.30 [0.60]	-0.063 [0.28]
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year)		$\checkmark$	0.89*** [0.0016] ✓		V	0.89*** [0.0016] ✓		~	0.89*** [0.0016] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.89*** [0.0016] ✓		~	0.89*** [0.0016] √
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	v 107,419 184.972 0.898
					Pan	el F: Great	European	Team							
Success (Big European team)	3.35* [1.94]	2.33 [1.43]	0.83 [0.66]	1.01 [1.56]	1.98* [1.15]	0.99* [0.53]	1.71 [1.36]	1.21 [1.03]	0.51 [0.47]	0.52 [1.22]	1.17 [0.93]	0.32 [0.43]	1.21 [1.16]	1.98** [0.90]	0.10 [0.42]
Female Performance			0.89*** [0.0016]			0.89*** [0.0016]			0.89*** [0.0016]			0.89*** [0.0016]			0.89*** [0.0016]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 184.942	✓ 118,945 184.942 0.479	√ √ 107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	✓ 118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	✓ 118,945 184.942 0.479	√ 107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	✓ 118,945 184.942 0.479	√ √ 107,419 184.972 0.898	118,945 184.942	✓ 118,945 184.942 0.479	√ √ 107,419 184.972 0.898

Table 9(b):Effect of Players' Success on 5th Grade Students' Performance - Portuguese Standardized Exams - 5th grade

	1 ye	1 year of success		2 ye	ars of succ	ess	3 ye	ars of succ	ess	4 ye	ars of succ	288	5 yea	ars of succe	288
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel C	6: Braziliar	ı National	Team							
Success (National Team)	-1.24 [1.64]	-0.98 [1.21]	0.048 [0.57]	1.56 [1.17]	0.77 [0.87]	0.059 [0.40]	2.87*** [0.94]	0.94 [0.71]	0.039 [0.33]	2.91*** [0.86]	-0.081 [0.66]	-0.10 [0.30]	3.60*** [0.77]	-0.49 [0.60]	-0.30 [0.28]
Female Performance			0.89*** [0.0016]												
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	· √ √		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	<b>1</b>		$\checkmark$	$\mathbf{x}$		$\checkmark$	
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	118,945 184.942	118,945 184.942 0.479	107,419 184.972 0.898												

Table 9(c): Effect of Players' Success on 5th Grade Students' Performance - Portuguese Standardized Exams - 5th grade

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to 5th grade male students' average performance on Prova Brasil's Portuguese test. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all schools that took Prova Brasil's exams between 2007 and 2015.

Control variables: number of girls that took the test, number of men that took the test, the proportion of male students that had a TV at home, the proportion of male students that had a personal computer at home, average number of people the male students live with, the proportion of male students that have been encouraged by their parents, average number of hours dedicated to domestic work among male students, proportion of male students that had a job, proportion of male students whose parents were still married, proportion of male students whose parents have finished high school, dummy that turns on when the school has the habit of talking to the parents when students aren't doing well, dummy that turns on if the school hasn't received enough resources during the previous year, dummy that turns on if the school offers sport activities, dummy that turns on if the community around is engaged with the school, dummy that equals one when there have been students caught with drugs during the previous year, dummy that equals one when there have been students caught with guns during the previous year.

	1 year of success		2 ye	ars of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of suce	cess	5 ye	ears of succ	less	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Pan	el A: Profe	ssional Pl	ayers							
Success (Professional Player)	-0.69 [1.23]	0.61 [1.19]	-0.52 [0.53]	0.32 [0.97]	1.70* [0.94]	-0.18 [0.42]	1.47* [0.77]	2.66*** [0.76]	0.065 [0.34]	0.75 [0.70]	1.83*** [0.70]	0.16 [0.31]	1.00 [0.65]	1.72*** [0.67]	0.22 [0.30]
Female Performance			0.91***			0.91***			0.91***			0.91***			0.91***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	[0.0017]												
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	88,275 250.264 0.831												
Panel B: Playing Abroad															
Success (Playing abroad)	4.39*** [1.30]	2.89** [1.26]	0.48 [0.56]	3.25*** [1.01]	2.71*** [0.98]	0.51 [0.44]	1.93** [0.78]	1.38* [0.76]	0.16 [0.34]	0.41 [0.71]	0.25 [0.69]	-0.31 [0.31]	0.20 [0.67]	0.29 [0.67]	-0.18 [0.30]
Female Performance			0.91*** [0.0017]												
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ ✓		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	√ √
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	88,275 250.264 0.831												
					Par	nel C: Tran	sferred Pla	iyers							
Success (Transferred)	4.52*** [1.36]	3.53*** [1.31]	0.45 [0.58]	2.72*** [1.00]	3.08*** [0.96]	0.35 [0.43]	1.81** [0.83]	1.67** [0.81]	-0.086 [0.36]	0.65 [0.74]	0.75 [0.72]	-0.52 [0.33]	1.21* [0.70]	1.12 [0.70]	-0.33 [0.31]
Female Performance			0.91*** [0.0017]												
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	1 1		$\checkmark$	√ √		$\checkmark$	1		$\checkmark$	1
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	88,275 250.264 0.831												

[able 10(a): Effect of Players' Sr	Success on 9th Grade Students'	Performance - Prova Brasil'	s Mathematics Standardized Exams
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	1 year of success		2 ye	ears of succ	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	ess	4 ye	ears of succ	cess	5 ye	ears of succ	ess	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
				Panel	D: Transf	ferred for n	nore than	6 million a	lollars						
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	-3.00 [2.03]	-2.39 [1.96]	0.85 [0.91]	-2.99** [1.45]	-2.57* [1.40]	0.38 [0.64]	-1.21 [1.30]	-1.05 [1.27]	0.49 [0.58]	-1.63 [1.18]	-1.61 [1.17]	0.53 [0.54]	-1.04 [1.14]	-1.12 [1.15]	0.53 [0.53]
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year)		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0017] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0017] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0017] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0017] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.91*** [0.0017] ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	√ 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	× 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	× 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	× 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	× 88,275 250.264 0.831
					Pan	el E: Great	Brazilian	Team							
Success (Big Brazilian team)	1.95 [1.20]	2.27* [1.16]	-0.26 [0.52]	0.60 [0.95]	1.17 [0.92]	-0.25 [0.41]	0.94 [0.82]	1.31 [0.80]	-0.29 [0.36]	0. <b>1</b> 5 [0.74]	0.66 [0.73]	0.018 [0.33]	0.61 [0.70]	0. <b>1</b> 8 [0.71]	0.048 [0.32]
Female Performance		/	0.91*** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.9 <b>1</b> *** [0.0017]
Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 250.265	✓ 96,965 250.265 0.100	√ 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	✓ 96,965 250.265 0.100	√ 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	✓ 96,965 250.265 0.100	√ 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	✓ 96,965 250.265 0.100	√ 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	✓ 96,965 250.265 0.100	√ 88,275 250.264 0.831
					Pan	el F: Great	European	Team							
Success (Big European team)	0.55 [1.93]	0.20 [1.86]	1.21 [0.85]	-0.10 [1.36]	0.20 [1.31]	0.81 [0.61]	2.14* [1.22]	1.98* [1.19]	0.99* [0.55]	0.41 [1.07]	0.62 [1.05]	1.04** [0.49]	0.91 [1.01]	1.52 [1.01]	1.33*** [0.47]
Female Performance			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 250.265	√ 96,965 250.265 0.100	× 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	✓ 96,965 250.265 0.100	88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	√ 96,965 250.265 0.100	× 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	√ 96,965 250.265 0.100	× 88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	√ 96,965 250.265 0.100	√ 88,275 250.264 0.831

	1 y	1 year of success		2 ye	ears of suce	ess	3 ye	ears of succ	cess	4 ye	ears of suce	cess	5 ye	ars of suce	ess
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel (	G: Brazilia	n Nationa	l Team							
Success (National Team)	3.10** [1.46]	4.19*** [1.41]	0.63 [0.65]	3.01*** [1.06]	3.62*** [1.03]	0.66 [0.46]	2.27*** [0.86]	2.83*** [0.84]	0.42 [0.38]	2.30*** [0.80]	2.08*** [0.79]	0.03 <b>1</b> [0.36]	1.74** [0.71]	1.27* [0.71]	-0.25 [0.32]
Female Performance			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]			0.9 <b>1</b> *** [0.0017]			0.91*** [0.0017]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$			$\checkmark$	· · · · ·		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	<i>\</i>		$\checkmark$	 ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	88,275 250.264 0.831	96,965 250.265	96,965 250.265 0.100	88,275 250.264 0.831									

Table 10(c): Effect of Players' Success on 9th Grade Students' Performance - Prova Brasil's Mathematics Standardized Exams

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to 9th grade male students' average performance on Prova Brasil's Portuguese test. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all schools that took Prova Brasil's exams between 2007 and 2015.

Control variables: number of girls that took the test, number of men that took the test, the proportion of male students that had a TV at home, the proportion of male students that had a personal computer at home, average number of people the male students live with, the proportion of male students that have been encouraged by their parents, average number of hours dedicated to domestic work among male students, proportion of male students that had a job, proportion of male students whose parents were still married, proportion of male students whose parents have finished high school, dummy that turns on when the school has the habit of talking to the parents when students aren't doing well, dummy that turns on if the school hasn't received enough resources during the previous year, dummy that turns on if the school offers sport activities, dummy that turns on if the community around is engaged with the school, dummy that equals one when there have been students caught with drugs during the previous year, dummy that equals one when there have been students caught with guns during the previous year.

	1 year of success			2 years of success			3 years of success			4 ye	ears of succ	cess	5 years of success		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Panel A: Professional Players															
Success (Professional Player)	-0.17	1.90	-0.038	0.51	2.56***	0.34	0.92	2.39***	0.28	0.21	1.76**	0.29	0.21	1.06	0.26
Female Performance	[1.33]	[1.22]	[0.54] 0.90***	[1.05]	[0.96]	[0.42] 0.90***	[0.83]	[0.78]	[0.34] 0.90***	[0.75]	[0.71]	[0.31] 0.90***	[0.69]	[0.68]	[0.30] 0.90***
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		$\checkmark$	[0.0017] ✓ ✓		~	[0.0017] ✓ ✓		~	[0.0017] ✓ ✓		~	[0.0017] ✓ ✓		~	[0.0017] ✓ ✓
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854
Panel B: Playing Abroad															
Success (Playing abroad)	2.88** [1.41]	-0.55 [1.29]	0.79 [0.57]	2.03* [1.10]	0.77 [1.00]	0.79* [0.44]	0.018 [0.84]	-0.73 [0.78]	0.40 [0.34]	-1.08 [0.76]	-1.19* [0.71]	0. <b>1</b> 9 [0.31]	-0.74 [0.72]	-0.91 [0.68]	0.26 [0.30]
Female Performance			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls	06.065	√ 06.065	√ √ 0775	06.065	√ 06.065	√ √ 00 0775	06.065	√ 06.065	√ √ 0775	06.065	√ 06.065	√ √ 99.075	06.065	√ 06.065	√ √ 00 075
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	232.551	232.551 0.210	0.854	232.551	232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	232.551	232.551 0.210	0.854	232.551	232.551 0.210	232.490 0.854	232.551	232.551 0.210	0.854
Panel C: Transferred Players															
Success (Transferred)	3.48** [1.47]	1.00 [1.34]	0.72 [0.59]	1.38 [1.08]	1.46 [0.98]	0.49 [0.44]	0.11 [0.89]	-0.23 [0.83]	0.22 [0.37]	-0.43 [0.79]	-0.40 [0.74]	0.049 [0.33]	0.98 [0.75]	0.46 [0.71]	0.18 [0.32]
Female Performance			0.90*** [0.00 <b>1</b> 7]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		√ 	√ ✓		√ 	√ ✓	0/ -/-	√ 	√ √	0/ -/-	√ 	<i>√</i>		<b>√</b>	<i>√</i>
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854

# Table 11(a): Effect of Players' Success on 9th Grade Students' Performance - Prova Brasil's Portuguese Standardized Exams

	1 year of success			2 years of success			3 y	3 years of success			4 years of success			5 years of success		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	
				Pane	l D: Trans	ferred for 1	nore than	6 million	dollars							
Success (Transferred - >6mi)	-1.27 [2.20]	-0.90 [2.00]	1.06 [0.92]	-0.75 [1.57]	-0.68 [1.43]	0.27 [0.65]	0.94 [1.40]	0.55 [1.29]	0.29 [0.59]	0.087 [1.27]	-0.58 [1.19]	0. <b>1</b> 3 [0.54]	1.43 [1.22]	0.54 [1.17]	0.015 [0.54]	
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		~	0.90*** [0.0017] √		~	0.90*** [0.0017] ✓		$\checkmark$	0.90*** [0.0017] ✓		√	0.90*** [0.0017] ✓		~	0.90*** [0.0017] ✓	
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	
Panel E: Great Brazilian Team																
Success (Big Brazilian team)	0.55 [1.30]	1.85 [1.19]	-0.051 [0.53]	0.32 [1.03]	1.50 [0.94]	-0.13 [0.42]	0.68 [0.88]	0.81 [0.82]	-0.31 [0.36]	0.018 [0.79]	0.64 [0.74]	0.077 [0.33]	0.17 [0.75]	-0.44 [0.72]	0.16 [0.32]	
Female Performance			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]	
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 232.551	√ 96,965 232.551 0.210	√ √ 88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	√ 96,965 232.551 0.210	√ √ 88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	√ 96,965 232.551 0.210	√ √ 88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	√ 96,965 232.551 0.210	√ √ 88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	√ 96,965 232.551 0.210	√ √ 88,275 232.490 0.854	
					Par	nel F: Great	European	Team								
Success (Big European team)	2.39 [2.09]	1.42 [1.90]	0.76 [0.86]	1.21 [1.48]	0.94 [1.34]	0.58 [0.61]	2.50* [1.31]	1.56 [1.21]	0.51 [0.56]	1.03 [1.14]	1.02 [1.07]	0.80 [0.49]	1.67 [1.09]	2.23** [1.03]	0.86* [0.48]	
Female Performance Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls Observations	96 965	√ 96.965	0.90*** [0.0017] ✓ ≪ 88.275	96 965	√ 96.965	0.90*** [0.0017] ✓ ≪ 88.275	96 965	√ 96.965	0.90*** [0.0017] ✓ ≪ 88.275	96 965	√ 96.965	0.90*** [0.0017] ✓ × 88.275	96 965	√ 96.965	0.90*** [0.0017] ✓ ≪ 88.275	
Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	232.551	232.551 0.210	232.490 0.854	232.551	232.551 0.210	232.490 0.854	232.551	232.551 0.210	232.490 0.854	232.551	232.551 0.210	232.490 0.854	232.551	232.551 0.210	232.490 0.854	

Table 11(b): Effect of Players' Success on 9th Grade Studen	s' Performance - Prova Brasil's Portuguese Standardized Exams
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	1 year of success			2 years of success			3 years of success			4 years of success			5 years of success		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
					Panel	G: Brazilia	an Nationa	al Team							
Success (National Team)	1.25 [1.58]	3.39** [1.44]	1.19* [0.66]	2.41** [1.15]	2.73*** [1.05]	1.01** [0.47]	2.52*** [0.92]	2.21** [0.86]	0.68* [0.39]	2.28*** [0.85]	1.20 [0.81]	0.50 [0.36]	1.77** [0.75]	0.87 [0.73]	0.44 [0.32]
Female Performance			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90***			0.90*** [0.0017]			0.90*** [0.0017]
Fixed Effects (School and Year) Controls		1	4		~	4		1	4		1	1		~	1
Observations Dep. Var. Mean R <sup>2</sup>	96,965 232.551	96,965 232,551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232,551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232,490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854	96,965 232.551	96,965 232.551 0.210	88,275 232.490 0.854

Table 11(c): Effect of Players' Success on 9th Grade Students' Performance - Prova Brasil's Portuguese Standardized Exams

Notes: Coefficients relating different measures for players' success to 9th grade male students' average performance on Prova Brasil's Portuguese test. Each line corresponds to one of the measures, which are, respectively: becoming a professional player, playing abroad (including free transfers and loans), being transferred to a foreign team for the first time, being transferred for more than 6 million dollars, playing for one of the Brazilian biggest teams, playing for one of the European biggest teams, playing for the Brazilian national team. The sample consists of all schools that took Prova Brasil's exams between 2007 and 2015.

Control variables: number of girls that took the test, number of men that took the test, the proportion of male students that had a TV at home, the proportion of male students that had a personal computer at home, average number of people the male students live with, the proportion of male students that had a personal computer at home, average number of people the male students live with, the proportion of male students that have been encouraged by their parents, average number of hours dedicated to domestic work among male students, proportion of male students that had a job, proportion of male students whose parents were still married, proportion of male students whose parents have finished high school, dummy that turns on when the school has the habit of talking to the parents when students aren't doing well, dummy that turns on if the school hasn't received enough resources during the previous year, dummy that turns on if the school offers sport activities, dummy that turns on if the community around is engaged with the school, dummy that equals one when there have been students caught with drugs during the previous year, dummy that equals one when there have been students caught with guns during the previous year.