PRESIDENTIAL CABINETS, ELECTORAL CYCLES, AND COALITION DISCIPLINE IN BRAZIL*

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by

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I. Introduction

Recent works on Latin American presidentialism (Amorim Neto 1998; Deheza 1998; Thibaut 1998) indicate that the frequency of coalition governments in this area is higher than expected by comparative theorists of this system of government (Jones 1995; Lijphart 1992; Linz 1994). While such finding reveals that Third World presidential democracies are able to devise extra-constitutional means by which the crisis proclivity of minority presidents can be overcome, it remains to be seen whether multiparty presidential cabinets can work as parliamentary-style coalitions which in general display a high degree of unity on the floor of parliament and operate in conjunction with the executive to promote legislation.

Brazil is a good starting point to tackle this question. There is an on-going debate in the comparative presidentialism literature about Brazil’s prevalent pattern of government formation. On the one hand, Abranches (1988), Deheza (1997, 192-230), and Meneguello (1998) contend that all Brazilian presidents appoint coalition governments. On the other, Amorim Neto (1994 and 1995) and Thibaut (1996, 282-321) caution against a loose application of the concept of coalition government to presidential systems, and argue that other types of cabinets have also been formed in this country. While Abranches, Deheza, and Meneguello simply count the number of parties drafted into the cabinet to assert their coalitional status, Amorim Neto and Thibaut also look at co-optation strategies (as opposed to coalition ones) employed by presidents in their dealings with political parties and social actors, and the recruitment criteria of individual ministers. However, all these five authors only provide illustrative evidence as to whether legislative policy-making is actually associated with the type of cabinet chosen by the chief executive. The type of a presidential cabinet does not hinge only on whether it is single-party or multi-party and whether it commands or not a majority of legislative seats. Presidential cabinets also vary according to how well parties are represented in the cabinet. Students of coalition politics in Europe provide a wealth of evidence showing that parties joining coalition governments as a rule receive ministerial payoffs proportional to their legislative weight ((Browne and Franklin 1973; Budge and Keman 1990, 88-131; Laver and Schofield 1990, 164-194; Schofield and Laver 1985 and 1990). Yet, in presidential regimes, given that presidents are constitutionally free to design the cabinet as they see fit, they may appoint a multiparty cabinet but not reward the parties based on a proportionality rule. What is the consequence of such coalition building strategy? Will it generate lower rates of legislative support to the president by the cabinet partners? Does a fair distribution of cabinet posts to parties help boost the support to the president?

As long as those question about the role of the cabinet in influencing legislative voting patterns remain improperly answered, any effort to establish whether multiparty cabinets in Brazil or in any other presidential systems actually work as parliamentary-style coalitional arrangements will arouse justified skepticism. After all, as Sartori (1997, 161) correctly puts it, “… the problems of presidentialism are not in the executive but in the legislative arena.” In this chapter I seek to analyze the impact of how cabinet posts are distributed to parties on the latter’s
legislative behavior in Brazil in 1989-1998 using roll call data. The effects of other relevant variables on legislative behavior, such as the elapsing of the president’s term and the ideological diversity of the cabinet, will also be checked.

The above mentioned period provides a suitable setting to test the impact of cabinets on legislative behavior in a single country, as there has been important variance on both the legislative behavior and cabinet membership across and within presidential terms. As presidents frequently appoint different cabinets over their terms, I can investigate how cabinet changes affect legislative behavior holding constant many intangible factors that affect presidents and legislators. Further, as discipline rates in Brazil vary across parties and over time, we can test for the impact of cabinet composition on these rates. This study will thus provide a case study of coalition politics in presidential systems, and an extension of the literature on Brazilian parties that have focused on their loose discipline (Amorim Neto and Santos N.d.; Limongi and Figueiredo 1995; Mainwaring and Liñán 1998) and the president’s use of budgetary resources and agenda-setting powers to obtain legislative support (Amorim Neto and Santos N.d; Limongi and Figueiredo 1998; Santos 1997).

This chapter will proceed as follows. In the next section I propose a quantitative measure to tap the degree of coalescence of presidential cabinets based on the distribution of ministerial portfolios to political parties. A coalition cabinet is defined as featuring at least two parties and a high degree of proportionality between parties’ cabinet shares and legislative weights. The application of that indicator to Brazil shows that there is a substantial variation in the degree of coalescence of cabinets in this country. In section three I briefly describe Brazil’s institutional structure in 1985-1999, and show how it relates to the politics of cabinet formation. Using time series analysis, the fourth section checks the impact of the degree of proportionality between cabinet shares and legislative weights plus two variables relating to the ideological makeup of cabinets and the elapsing of the president’s term on coalition discipline using roll calls taken in 1989-1998. In section five I provide party-specific tests of support to the executive. Section six concludes.

II. The degree of coalescence of presidential cabinets

In this section my goal is to propose an indicator based on the partisan distribution of ministerial portfolios that will allow us to measure the coalescence of presidential cabinets, and to provide the criteria to pin down when a new cabinet is formed. Coalescence will be here understood as a continuous variable: the higher the proportionality between parties’ cabinet shares and legislative weights, the more coalescent the cabinet. Based on this notion of coalescence, in the next section I will empirically check whether more coalescent cabinets are associated with higher legislative discipline of cabinet parties.

Can presidential cabinets work as coalitional arrangements as in parliamentary systems? In principle, yes. But, it is not enough for politicians from at least two parties to simply join the cabinet. As Laver and Schofield (1990, 130) contend, a coalition means that there must be a binding agreement between those parties. However, the authors are considering parliamentary systems in this definition, and coalition agreements do not work in the same way in presidential

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1 It should be noted that Figueiredo and Limongi assert that Brazilian parties are actually fairly disciplined, and behave in a predictable manner.

2 For an analysis of the application of this measure to cabinets in 10 Latin American countries, see Amorim Neto (1998, ch. 3).
systems. Politicians from different parties may be appointed ministers by a president, but this does not mean that the parties endorsed those appointments. That is to say, their appointment does not necessarily bind their parties to support the president in the legislature (Mainwaring 1993). Moreover, one could argue that a president may strike one binding agreement with party X, and a second binding agreement with party Y. Yet those agreements may very well not bind parties X and Y to each other. But one thing is the formation of a coalition cabinet, another thing is coalition governance. Even in a parliamentary regime a well-cemented coalition cabinet may unravel in a short period of time due to inter- or intra-party conflicts, and this does not signify that the cabinet was not a coalition when it was formed. So in order to avoid the conceptual confusion between coalition formation and coalition governance I posit that a coalition cabinet in a presidential system simply requires an agreement over cabinet appointments between the president and more than one party. The question, then, becomes: does the design of a coalition agreement affect coalition governance as evinced by the legislative behavior of cabinet parties? In this chapter I argue that the answer is positive, and that if coalition agreements provide for a proportional distribution of cabinet shares relative to legislative weights, coalition parties should display a disciplined behavior towards the president on roll call votes.

How do we empirically observe that an agreement was actually struck? We would have to obtain historical and/or newspaper accounts of the negotiations over all appointments made to appoint a cabinet. This procedure would be too time consuming. Moreover, even if a researcher were able to collect accounts of the appointment of all ministers, many deals actually cut by presidents and party leaders would go unnoticed because of the secrecy often surrounding political negotiations. She would thus have to make judgment calls to classify some cabinets. Such procedures would often result in \textit{ad hoc-ery}, which would certainly hurt the analysis’ reliability.

It is nonetheless possible to avoid such pitfalls by making some plausible assumptions about what constitutes an agreement over cabinet formation, and relying solely on the basic information available on cabinet ministers, namely, their party affiliation (if any), appointment and dismissal dates, and the legislative weight of their parties. Thus, I assume that if a president and more than one party reach a coalition agreement over the composition of the cabinet, the parties receive ministerial portfolios in a measure roughly proportional to their legislative weight. By this logic, proportionality in cabinet shares is the equilibrium solution for the bargaining problems faced by presidents and parties regarding the division of the executive pie. Actually, students of parliamentary regimes have demonstrated empirically that coalition payoffs in Europe are distributed according to the legislative size and bargaining power of parties (Browne and Franklin 1973; Budge and Keman 1990, 88-131; Laver and Schofield 1990, 164-194; Schofield and Laver 1985 and 1990). Additionally, I posit that the degree of coalescence of presidential cabinets is a continuous variable. Hence, the proportionality norm will be here employed as a yardstick to identify the degree of coalescence of cabinets. Ministerial allocations deviating from proportionality should therefore be seen as a characteristic of cabinets displaying lower levels of coalescence. The assumption here is that the more cabinet shares deviate from proportionality, the less coalitional the cabinet.

\footnote{I am using the concept of equilibrium in the technical game-theoretic sense of a Nash equilibrium, that is, a situation in which no actor has an incentive to move unilaterally.}
To account for the relationship between cabinet shares and legislative weight, I propose a mathematical indicator called Cabinet Coalescence Rate (call it \( \text{CABINET} \)). It is based on the index of proportionality devised by Rose (1984) to measure the amount of deviation from proportionality between seats and votes that a given election produces. Here ministries and seats take the place of seats and votes. The index’s formula is:

\[
\text{CABINET} = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (|S_i - M_i|)
\]

where:

- \( M_i = \% \) of ministries party \( i \) receives when the cabinet appointed;
- \( S_i = \% \) of legislative seats party \( i \) holds in the total of seats commanded by the parties joining the cabinet when the cabinet is appointed.

In order to arrive at the coalescence rate for a given cabinet, add up the absolute value of the difference between the percent of ministries and the percent of legislative seats for all parties joining the cabinet, whether or not these parties hold legislative seats, and for all ministers, whether party members or not, and then divide the total by two. Subtracting the result from 1 yields the coalescence rate. The index varies between zero (no correspondence between ministerial payoffs and legislative seats) and one, which defines an upper limit of perfect correspondence between cabinet shares and legislative weights. Any departure from this upper limit is detected. To work properly, the index requires that at least one minister be a partisan. If all ministers were non-partisans, the index would yield the value of 0.5, a result that does not match the meaning of a partly coalitional cabinet. So in the case of a ministerial distribution with no partisans, zero should simply be assigned as its coalescence rate.

The values obtained with this index express a relation between the information available to the analyst - the percent of ministers belonging to a given party and that party's share in the total number of legislative seats nominally commanded by the party labels included in the cabinet. That is to say, \( \text{CABINET} \) measures how the distribution of cabinet posts is roughly weighed vis-à-vis the dispersion of legislative seats across the legislative contingent of the parties joining the executive. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical case:

Table 1 below reports a 100-seat legislature divided among three parties, A, B, and C, and a cabinet comprising 10 portfolios. The president allocates 2 portfolios to A, 6 to C, and appoints 2 independent ministers. A and C together command 65 seats, therefore \( S_a = 0.31 \) (=20/65), \( S_c = 0.69 \) (= 45/65), and the independent ministers each score 0 on \( S_i \). As for the percentage of portfolios \( (M_i) \), A has 0.2, C, 0.6, and each independent minister, 0.1. The sum of all \( |M_i - S_i| \) values is 0.4; this result divided by 2 gives us 0.2, which subtracted from 1 leaves 0.8. This result tells us that the allocation of portfolios in this cabinet deviates from perfect proportionality, but the correspondence between cabinet shares and legislative seats is still high.
Table 1 - Hypothetical Example of How to Calculate the Cabinet Coalescence Rate

| Legislative Parties | Cabinet Shares | S_i(%) | M_i(%) | |M_i - S_i|
|---------------------|----------------|--------|--------|----------------|
| A = 20 seats        | 2              | 0.31   | 0.2    | 0.11           |
| B = 35 seats        | 6              | 0.69   | 0.6    | 0.09           |
| C = 45 seats        | Independent    | 0      | 0.1    | 0.1            |
|                     | Independent    | 0      | 0.1    | 0.1            |
| Total = 100 seats   | 10 portfolios  |        |        | 0.4            |

Cabinet Coalescence Rate = 1 - 1/2*0.4 = 1 - 0.2 = 0.8

Although CABINET does capture much information, there are two concerns. First, note that it assumes that all cabinet posts are of equal value. In the real world of politics they are not. Some cabinet posts are often more important than others. The finance ministry is always a good example. However, any procedure to quantify the different political value of cabinet posts would hardly be reliable and would always be open to criticism. For instance, if we were to use the budgetary appropriations allocated to ministries to measure their relative political value, a highly prized post such as the foreign office would score very low in Brazil, in particular, and in Latin American, in general. So while recognizing that assuming equal political value for all ministries is an imperfect solution, I contend that it is more reliable than any effort to quantify such value.

Second, CABINET assumes that a party’s bargaining power is directly proportional to the size of its legislative delegation. There may be some circumstances under which a small party can successfully demand that it be over-represented in the cabinet so as to join it. This is likely to happen in pure parliamentary regimes because the survival of the government in office depends on the tolerance of legislative parties. However, in pure presidential systems such as Brazil small parties’ ability to extract disproportional concessions is severely reduced owing to the president’s fixed term of office.

Cabinet Change

Presidents in a pure presidential system are constitutionally entitled to freely dismiss their ministers. Hence, new cabinets may be formed over a president’s term. How do we identify them? Three criteria are applied to distinguish a new presidential cabinet:

(1) the inauguration of a new president;
(2) a change in the party membership of the cabinet; and
(3) a change of more than 50% in the identity of individual ministers.

The first criterion is obvious. In presidential systems the inauguration of a new presidency represents a wholesale change in the executive branch because the executive power is vested solely in the head of the state. The second criterion is required because CABINET is centered on the party makeup of the executive, and any change in it constitutes of necessity a new cabinet. And the third is included because in a presidential system, as individual ministers
must ultimately run their portfolios according to presidential goals, a major change in the identity of ministers may also represent a major change in the way the president wants to run the executive branch and the way he deals with the parties and the legislature.

Military Officers in the Cabinet

Finally, I consider high-ranking military officers, who, as a rule, are appointed to head the Army, Navy, and Air Force Ministries in Brazil, as independents. However, only the Army Ministry will be included in the calculations. The reason for this simplification is to avoid overestimation of non-partisan ministers.

Presidential Cabinets in Brazil

Table 2 below provides the coalescence rate and other indicators of the cabinets appointed by the 4 presidents in 1985-1999. As the data show, there is a substantial variation in the coalescence rates in Brazil, ranging from a minimum of 0.22 (Franco’s fifth cabinet) to a maximum of 0.62 (Francos’s first cabinet). Based on their values on CABINET, one can hardly say that the last cabinet of Sarney and Franco and those appointed by Collor are coalition cabinets, whereas the the first cabinet appointed by Sarney and the two cabinets appointed by Cardoso are certainly so. In the next section I briefly review the institutional structure of Brazil’s presidentialism so as to relate it to the politics of cabinet formation.

IV. The Institutional Structure of Presidentialism in Brazil

In March 1985 a civilian president, selected by an electoral college composed of congressmembers and 6 representatives from each state legislature, was sworn in after 21 years of military dictatorship and a protracted transition started in 1974. One of the first acts of the new regime was to confer constitution-making powers to the Congress to be elected in November 1986. This Congress was inaugurated in February 1987, and was only able to promulgate a new constitutional text in October 1988. So between March 1985 and October 1988 the political system operated under the provisions of the 1967 Constitution enacted by the military. These provisions provided for a pure, strong presidential regime under which the president had total control over the executive branch, and could govern by decree almost unhampered by legislative checks (Pessanha 1997, ch. 3). If Congress failed to deliberate on the decrees issued by the executive in 30 days, they were considered approved.

After the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, Brazil’s presidentialism displayed the following features. The president is elected by majority rule, with a runoff between the two top tickets if no candidate obtains more than 50% of the valid votes in the first round. From 1985 to 1994 the presidential term was five years. In 1994 the term was reduced to four years. In June 1997 the Congress approved, for the first time in its history, a constitutional amendment allowing presidents to run for one consecutive term. The 1988 Constitution grants the chief executive the

4 In this chapter I will delve only into the problems of legislative fragmentation and presidential powers, leaving the question of federalism aside. Readers interested in the latter topic should consult the works of Abrucio (1998), Dias (1997), Mainwaring (1997), and Samuels and Abrucio (1997).
power to issue a partial and total veto over bills; the ability to initiate legislation, with monopoly of initiative over many policy areas; the power to freely appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers; and the prerogative adopt medidas provisórias (provisional measures) with the immediate force of law. Provisional measures must be submitted immediately to Congress, and if not converted into law within 30 days, they lose effectiveness. Although article 62 states that provisional measures may only be issued to deal with urgent and relevant matters, they have actually become the presidents’ most preferred policy-making instrument, particularly for the implementation of economic policy. Figueiredo and Limongi (1997, 144) show that in 1988-1995 1,249 provisional measures were issued. Yet it should be noted that out of this total 862 were basically reiterated versions of measures which Congress failed to consider within 30 days of their issuance. Such a high rate of re-issued provisional measures is a clear sign that this constitutional weapon tempts presidents to act unilaterally and to overstep their legislative powers (Power 1998).

**Multipartism**

A key factor affecting executive-legislative relations in any democratic polity is the partisan distribution of power in the legislative branch. According to a survey of 54 democracies (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997, 169-170), in the 1980s Brazil had one of the most fragmented legislatures in the world. For many analysts, such a high level of fragmentation cripples the decisiveness of the political system (Lamounier 1994; Mainwaring 1995), thus seriously hurting the country’s prospects for democratic consolidation. As a measure of legislative fragmentation I use the conventional Laakso and Taagepera index of effective number of parties (1979), the formula of which is:

\[ N = 1/x_i^2 \]

where

\[ x_i = \text{% of seats held by the } i\text{-th party with representation in the lower chamber}. \]

Tables 3 below reports the effective number of legislative parties in Brazil in 1985-1999.

**TABLE 3**

Effective Number of Legislative Parties (1985-1999)

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* First year of a new legislature elected the previous year.

5 Other summaries of the 1988 Constitutions can be found in Carey, Amorim Neto, and Shugart (1997) and Mainwaring (1997).
In the period from 1985 to 1992, the fragmentation of Brazil's lower chamber almost tripled (from 3.2 to 9.4). It is true that it declined from 1986 to 1987, and stabilized from 1996 to 1999, but the central trend for the whole period is one of dramatically increasing fragmentation. In the 1985-1999 period the mean size of the president’s party was 12.3% of lower chamber seats. High fragmentation in Brazil resulted from the combined effects of two factors: the electoral decline of the two largest parties of the military period (the PDS and PMDB), and unrestrained party switching on the part of federal deputies (Lima Júnior 1993; Nicolau 1996).

How does legislative fragmentation affect presidentialism? Many authors have already delved into this question (Mainwaring 1993; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Jones 1995), and the tenor of their conclusions is one: the higher legislative fragmentation, the weaker the president’s party support. The data above show that Brazil provides compelling evidence to this effect.

How does the institutional structure of presidentialism relate to coalition formation in Brazil? Using data on 75 cabinets appointed by 57 presidents in 10 Latin American countries in the 1946-1995 period Amorim Neto (1998, ch. 3) has demonstrated that cabinet coalescence is a positive function of the size of the president’s party, and a negative function of whether the constitution grants the president the power to issue decree laws. The larger the size of the president’s party, the higher CABINET. The power to issue decrees, in turn, leads to a lower CABINET. The link between the size of the president’s party and CABINET is that presidents with strong party support tend to make policy mostly through statutes. They thus build more coaltional cabinets to solidify support in the legislature. Presidents with weak party support prefer policy-making strategies other than statutes. So they use cabinet appointments for other purposes, such as to reward cronies or to bring policy expertise into the executive branch. Likewise, presidents with decree authority are prone to make policy with this unilateral instrument, which does not necessitate high rates of CABINET. Unlike in 1946-1964, all Brazilian presidents had decree authority in 1985-1999. So, much of the variation in CABINET in this period is explained by the size of the president’s party. For example, Collor’s cabinets scored so low on CABINET in part because his party commanded a very small share of lower chamber seats.

V. The Impact of Presidential Cabinets on Legislative Voting

In order to analyze the impact of CABINET on coalitional behavior in the legislative arena, we need to find a valid measure of the latter. Legislators behave in a coalitional fashion when the members of the same coalition act as unity. There are two key legislative arenas in which coalitional behavior can be readily observed, namely, committees and the assembly’s floor. The second is certainly the most relevant because the decisions there often convey the assembly’s last word on policy. Also, a greater number of representatives are required for floor

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6 Additional comments on Brazil’s impressive rates of party switching are in order. Table 3 above shows that legislative fragmentation varies within a single legislature. Party switching is the main cause of this fact because it alters the partisan distribution of seats during a single legislature. When changing parties, deputies either go to older labels or create new ones. According to Nicolau (1996, 65), 64.6% of the members of the legislature elected in 1994 have switched party at least once since 1980. Some deputies change their party affiliation even twice in the same legislature. Party switching reached its peak in the late 1980s. The effective number of legislative parties that emerged in the 1986 election was 2.8. However, due to party switching, it jumped to 4.1 in 1988, to 5.5 in 1989, and 7.1 to in 1990, the last year of this legislature.
decisions to be made than for committees. That is to say, the floor offers a more representative sample of the whole legislature than do committees.

Further, the assembly’s floor is the best arena to observe the degree to which coalition agreements over cabinet composition are actually binding on legislative parties. Consider a comparison between presidential and parliamentary regimes. To begin with, in presidential systems inter-branch cooperation is harder to achieve than in parliamentary regimes. This is ultimately due to the fixed term of office of both president and assembly. Such provision ensures that the chief executive does not have to resign in case a government-sponsored bill is defeated, neither can the assembly be dissolved in case of an executive-legislative deadlock. Members of governing parties in presidential systems, therefore, feel much freer to vote against the executive on the assembly’s floor than their counterparts in parliamentary systems. If the latter wish to do so, the prime minister can always threaten to resign, probably triggering a snap election, whose consequence may be the defeat of the governing parties. Anticipating this outcome, backbenchers, as a rule, prefer to transfer their eventual conflicts with the cabinet to arenas other than the house of parliament. In this sense, prime ministers have a strong weapon to induce compliance from their rank-and-file as far as floor behavior is concerned. That is why roll call decisions in parliamentary systems are usually a foregone conclusion, with the cabinet line almost always having the final say. Only on few and extraordinary occasions can one observe backbenchers voting against the cabinet on the parliament’s floor.

By this logic, roll calls are not the best evidence for the analysis of legislative cohesion in parliamentary systems. Legislative discipline (or conflict) in parliamentary regimes is best observed in party caucuses and conventions and in cabinet meetings, where the party line is formed, and where divergent preferences can be safely given free rein. In these arenas a compromise between the cabinet position and those of individual legislators is often reached so that bills taken to the floor stand a very low risk of defeat. In most presidential regimes, particularly those in which party discipline is not tight, as in Brazil and the U.S., however, roll call votes are characterized by a great deal of uncertainty for the reason stated above. Separation of powers poses a serious commitment problem to presidents in their dealings with legislators, and this problem is clearly reflected in floor behavior. In view of this fact and the loose discipline of Brazilian political parties roll call votes will be used to test the legislative impact of presidential cabinets.

Some observations about the rules governing roll calls in Brazil are in order. According to the standing orders of the Chamber of Deputies, motions can be decided by three kinds of voting procedures: secret vote, voice vote, and roll call vote. A secret vote requires a 2/3 quorum, and is designed to decide on the establishment of investigation committees and the impeachment of presidents, legislators, and judges. The voice vote is the most frequently employed decision rule. For a voice vote to be valid, a minimum of 50% + 1 of deputies should be present on the floor. But voice votes can be taken without the lower chamber’s steering body checking whether a majority is present. However, if after a voice vote some deputies consider that the minimum quorum required for the vote to be valid had not been met, they can request a quorum counting. Any quorum counting request supported by at least 10% of the lower chamber membership triggers a roll call vote.
Hence, in Brazil roll calls provide opposition legislators with an opportunity to make decisions by majorities more costly -- because preferences have to be publicly disclosed, which is not the case with voice votes -- and slower -- because the majority has to vote twice on the same bill. So roll calls constitute an important obstructionist tool in the hands of the opposition. This means that roll calls are a good site to observe party conflict and coalition discipline in Brazil in particular.\textsuperscript{8}

\textit{Data}

I have considered all roll calls taken in the Chamber of Deputies in 1989-1998 for which there was information on the preferences of the president. The reason for looking only at these roll calls is straightforward: since this section’s goal is to check the extent to which legislators affiliated with the parties represented in the presidential cabinet behave as a unity, roll calls that convey some information on the president’s agenda are the most valid ones for this purpose.

Ascertaining the president’s position is straightforward in Brazil due to a provision entitling presidents to appoint a so-called government leader in the Chamber of Deputy. The role of this leader is to communicate the president’s preferences over legislative bills to party leaders and legislators and negotiate with them. Before a roll call is taken the government leader is asked by the chair of the lower house to announce the executive’s position on the matter to be voted on.

420 roll calls for which there was information on the government leader’s position were found in 1989-1998. This period covers the last two years of the 1987-1990 legislature, all years of the 1991-1994 and 1995-1998 legislatures; the last year of the Sarney administration, the entire presidencies of Collor and Franco; and the first term of Cardoso.

\textit{The Dependent Variable: Coalition Discipline of the Cabinet Parties}

Coalition discipline is here defined as the degree of coalition unity on voting decisions (call it COAL). As my focus is on the behavior of parties with politicians appointed to the cabinet, I measure coalition discipline as follows:

\[
\text{COAL} = \frac{\% \text{ of the total legislative membership of the cabinet parties voting in accordance with the orientation of the government leader on each roll call.}}{}
\]

Note that this measure assumes that abstention and absence are also forms of non-cooperative behavior vis-à-vis the government. If we were to assume that the only form of non-cooperative behavior on the part of individual deputies vis-à-vis the government leader is when the former vote explicitly against the recommendation of the latter (e.g., the government leader recommends that deputies vote aye, and a deputy affiliated with one of the cabinet parties votes nay or vice versa), then, we would be over-estimating coalition discipline.

For example, suppose that a presidential cabinet is composed of parties A, B, and C. Party A holds 60 legislative seats; party B, 30; and party C, 10. In a given roll, 54 legislators of party A were present. 37 voted aye, and 17 voted nay. 24 legislators of party B turned out to vote. 20 voted aye, and 4 voted nay. As for party C, 8 responded to the roll call, with 4 voting aye, and 4 voting nay. Now suppose we know the position of the government leader, and that she oriented the cabinet parties to vote aye. If abstention and absence are discounted, the coalition discipline

\textsuperscript{8} In countries where party discipline is tight, as in Venezuela in the 1959-1993 period, the analysis of roll call votes is meaningless (Coppedge 1994).
discipline of the cabinet parties on this roll call is: \((37 + 20 + 4)/(54 + 24 + 8) = 61/86 = 0.71.\) However, if we include abstention and absence in the denominator, the coalition discipline rate is: \((37 + 20 + 4)/(60 + 30 + 10) = 61/100 = 0.61.\)

Finally, as many authors have emphasized (Bond and Fleisher 1991; Carey 1999; Limongi and Figueiredo 1995; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán 1998; Riker 1959) not all roll calls are meaningful for coalition behavior and party conflict. Roll calls on which there is consensus or near consensus are less relevant than those on which the sizes of the majority and the minority are close. Likewise, roll calls with a low attendance can also be said to be less relevant than those with high attendance. Therefore, clear criteria of roll call relevance must be set up, taking into account both vote closeness and attendance. The solution adopted here is to establish a cutoff point based on the indicator of roll call “critical-ness” proposed by Carey (1999). The formula of a roll call’s critical-ness is:

\[
\text{CRITICAL-NESS} = \text{ATTEND} \times \text{CLOSE}
\]

where

\[
\text{ATTEND} = \% \text{ of legislators voting} \\
\text{CLOSE} = 1 - (2 \times |0.5 - \% \text{aye}|)
\]

\[
\% \text{aye} = \# \text{aye/entire lower chamber membership}
\]

Only roll calls on which there is at least 0.6 of legislators voting and on which at least 0.2 of legislators dissent from the majority will be included. Plugging those numbers in the above formula, this means that for a roll call to be selected it has to score at least 0.24 on Carey’s indicator of critical-ness.\(^9\) By applying the 0.24 cutoff point, the final sample was reduced to 324 meaningful roll calls. Table 4 below displays the mean value and the standard deviation of COAL per cabinet along with individual parties’ support to the president (defined in the next section).

\[\text{TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE}\]

**The Key Independent Variable: Cabinet Coalescence**

The key hypothesis to be tested is the following:

\[
\text{H1: The more coalescent the cabinet, the more disciplined the behavior of the legislators belonging to the cabinet parties on roll calls.}
\]

This is expected to be so because a cabinet with a high coalescence rate reflects a judicious allocation of ministerial posts to the parties by the president. Such allocation is very

\(^9\) According to Carey, as some votes require extraordinary majorities to pass, the index of roll call critical-ness should be adjusted accordingly. For example, if an extraordinary threshold is set at 0.67 of the entire membership of the legislature, this value should be used in the place of 0.5. In Brazil there are three types of majorities: simple majority (for standard bill proposals), absolute majority of the entire membership of the legislature (for votes on bills regulating constitutional articles), and a 0.6 majority of the entire membership (for constitutional amendments). As I do not have reliable information on the type of majority required for each roll call, I opted for a compromise solution, 0.5, which means that an absolute majority is being required.
likely to bring the parties drafted into the cabinet to a more consistent support to the executive. So I expect that the cabinet coalescence rate will have a positive sign in the regression equations.

*Other Relevant Independent Variables: The Elapsing of the President’s Term and the Ideological Range of the Cabinet*

Underlying the cabinet coalescence rate is the assumption that parties are office-seeking actors. However, as forcefully argued by Strom (1990), parties have another two fundamental concerns, namely, vote maximization and the pursuit of policy goals. How do vote and policy seeking affect coalition discipline in the context of Brazilian politics?

Given that in pure presidential regimes the president’s term is fixed, as the latter elapses, the value of holding ministerial posts for parties declines over time as concerns with office seeking give way to vote maximization (Altman 1998; Amorim Neto and Santos N.d.). By this logic, larger opposition factions should emerge inside the legislative contingent of cabinet parties as the president’s term comes to an end. Therefore, coalition unity should also ebb over time. So the second hypothesis to be tested is:

**H2: As the president’s term elapses, coalition discipline on roll calls declines.**

To operationalize the elapsing of the president’s term, I simply count the temporal distance in days between the day a roll call is taken and the constitutional end of a given administration (call this variable \( \text{ELAPSE} \)).

\[
\text{ELAPSE} = T_e - T_r
\]

where

\( T_e = \text{the day the president’s term constitutionally ends}; \)

\( T_r = \text{the day a roll call is taken}. \)

For example, if a roll call on a bill is taken on the 90th day of a five-year presidential term (total of 1825 days), this roll call’s score on ELAPSE is: 1825 – 90 = 1735. I expect this variable to have a positive sign. That is to say, early in the president’s term, when the distance between the days roll calls are taken and the presidency’s expected end are larger, coalition unity should take on higher values.

What about policy concerns? Although Brazil’s largest parties (those often drafted into the cabinet) are usually seen as mostly clientelistic organizations, they also have an identifiable ideological profile (Figueiredo and Limongi 1995; Kinzo 1993; Mainwaring 1999, 88-135), which affects their electoral coalition strategies (Schmitt 1999) and legislative behavior (Figueiredo and Limongi 1995). If this much is true, then the ideological diversity of the cabinet should impact on coalition discipline. Cabinets joined by highly ideologically diverse parties should display lower levels of coalition discipline than cabinets composed of ideologically homogeneous partners. For example, a cabinet joined by two centrist parties (a highly homogeneous coalition) is very likely to generate higher rates of coalition discipline than a
cabinet composed of three parties, one centrist, the other center-right, and the third center-left. This is so because the coordination of cabinet parties’ preferences is much more difficult to achieve under the latter cabinet than under the former. Thus, I surmise that

**H3:** The more ideologically diverse the cabinet, the lower coalition discipline on roll calls.

To operationalize the cabinet ideological diversity I measure the ideological distance between the furthest-left and the furthest-right cabinet parties (call this variable IDRANGE). How is it measured? Following Coppedge (1997) and Mainwaring (1999), I assume that the most salient cleavage that divides Brazilian parties is the classic Left-Right one. Additionally, these two authors place Brazilian parties on the five standard positions along the left-right dimension, namely, left, center-left, center, center-right, and right. Drawing on a similar procedure adopted by Coppedge, I further posit that the distance between each contiguous position is 0.5. Thus, if a cabinet is joined by a center, a center-left, and center-right party, its score on IDRANGE is the distance between the latter two parties, that is, 1.0. IDRANGE varies between 0 and 2. 0 is the IDRANGE value for all cabinets whose parties are all placed on the same ideological position. 2 is the value for all cabinets being joined by both a left and a right party.

\[
\text{IDRANGE} = |P_{fl} - P_{fr}|
\]

where

- \(P_{fl}\) = the ideological position on the left-right dimension of the furthest-left party represented in the cabinet;
- \(P_{fr}\) = the ideological position on the left-right dimension of the furthest-right party represented in the cabinet.

Note that IDRANGE is an imperfect indicator of ideological diversity because it does not take into account the ministerial share held by each ideological bloc represented in the cabinet. An ideal measure would have to include both the ideological positions and the ministerial shares of all ideological blocs represented in the cabinet in the same way as Coppedge (1998) does to calculate the effective number of ideological blocs in Latin American party systems. However, it is impossible to apply such measure owing to the high percent of non-partisan ministers in Brazilian cabinets. The only reliable method to identify the ideological position of non-partisan ministers is experts surveys. Unfortunately, there are no experts surveys on the ideological position of Brazilian ministers.

---

10 Note that ideological diversity is a key government attribute to explain cabinet survival in parliamentary democracies (Warwick 1994, 49-74). Tsebelis (1995) argues that the same variables that explain the breakdown of presidential democracies also account for cabinet termination in parliamentary democracies, namely, the number of partisan veto points and the heterogeneity of preferences. However, if we assume democratic stability, coalition discipline as a function of the ideological diversity of the cabinet is presidentialism’s functional equivalent of cabinet survival in parliamentarism.

11 According to Coppedge (1997) and Mainwaring (1999), the ideological position of all the 12 parties that joined the cabinet at least once since 1985 is the following. On the left: PT, PSB, and PPS; on the center-left: PSDB, and PDT; on the center: FMDB; on the center-right: PTB; and on the right: PFL, PDS, PP, PL, and PRN.
Table 2 shows that no cabinet formed in 1985-1999 was all occupied by partisan ministers, and that the percent of non-partisan is high in many cabinets. For example, Franco’s last cabinet had 76.0% non-partisan ministers, Collor’s first three cabinets, 60.0%, and Cardoso’s two cabinets, 32.0%. One way to reduce the error of not considering the ministerial share of each ideological position represented in the cabinet is to apply IDRANGE only for parties holding more than one cabinet post or at least 5.0% of lower chamber seats. It is better to use these arbitrary but plausible relevance criteria than to over-estimate the weight of tiny parties in the cabinet ideological diversity. Let us thus restate the definition of IDRANGE: it measures the ideological distance between the furthest-left and furthest-right cabinet parties that meet one of the two relevance criteria. Table 2 above displays the IDRANGE for all cabinets in 1985-1999.

All in all, the resulting regression equation takes the following form:

$$WCOAL = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{CABINET} + \beta_2 \text{ELAPSE} + \beta_3 \text{IDRANGE} + \varepsilon$$

(eq. 1)

Results

The regression results are displayed below in Table 5. In Model 1, the full model, both CABINET and ELAPSE were found significant at the 0.01 level, in a one-tailed test. IDRANGE was not statistically discernible from zero, and came with the wrong sign. A second model was run without IDRANGE on the right-hand side of the equation. CABINET and ELAPSE remained significant at the same level as in the first model. In a third model ELAPSE was dropped. In this model CABINET continued to be significant at the 0.01 level, and IDRANGE was again not found significant, and came with the wrong sign. I checked whether IDRANGE had a multicollinearity problem by correlating it with CABINET and ELAPSE. IDRANGE and CABINET were found to be highly correlated (a 0.75 correlation). So a fourth model was run without CABINET on the right-hand side of the equation. ELAPSE was not found significant. However, IDRANGE had for the first time a significant effect on coalition discipline but, again, came with the wrong sign.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Given the employment of time series data, I checked for autocorrelation by regressing the unstandardized residuals on its lags and all other explanatory variables for the four models. No autocorrelation problem was detected in either case.

Why did IDRANGE fail to be significant? With all probability, because it is too crude a measure. So only when a more refined indicator is available will the impact of the ideological diversity of Brazilian cabinets be properly checked.

At any rate, which model to choose? Model 2 is clearly the best because the coefficients on the independent variables are the highest, their significance are also the highest, and it has the highest adjusted R-squared (albeit just a bit higher than that of Model 1). Holding ELAPSE constant in this model, a unit increase in CABINET is approximately associated with a unit increase in cabinet coalescence. So, for example, if a president changes a government scoring 0.4 on CABINET to one scoring 0.6, an increase of 0.19 in cabinet coalescence should be observed. Holding CABINET constant, the coefficient on ELAPSE indicates that if a roll call is taken
when there are still 1000 days (approximately 3 years) for the president’s term to elapse, coalition discipline should increase by .08 relative to a roll call taken by the end of the term.

The meaning of the results are clear-cut: cabinets with a higher coalescence rate maximize the coalition discipline of governing parties, and cabinet coalescence decreases later in the president’s term.

V. Party-specific tests of support to the president

In this section I provide party-specific tests of support to the president. Let us first glance at the most relevant governing parties.

On the center of the left-right dimension the key player is the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB - Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement). In spite of its marked electoral decline since 1988, it was Brazil’s largest legislative party from 1985 to 1996. It held the presidency under José Sarney in 1985-1990. Table 2 indicates that the PMDB was represented in all but three of the 14 cabinets appointed in 1985-1998.

On the right the Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL - Party of the Liberal Front) stands out as the most relevant party. It became the second largest party in 1986, and since 1997 it has been the largest one, having participated in all presidential cabinets appointed since 1985.

Finally, the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB - Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy) was created in 1988 during the National Constituent Assembly as a breakaway from the PMDB. It is a center-left organization, and has been an increasingly important party since the election to the presidency of one of its leaders, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in 1994, and his re-election in 1998. It became the third largest legislative party in 1995, and after the 1998 races it is the second largest one. The PSDB was first drafted into the cabinet by president Collor in 1992. Since then this party has always occupied key ministerial posts.

I hypothesize that individual parties will cooperate with the president if they see positive benefits for doing so. These benefits can imply serving career ambitions, winning pork, or passing favored policy initiatives. One way to assure these benefits is for party politicians to take up cabinet positions. In order to keep their posts, I assume that cabinet ministers must work to assure the support of their party for the president. Further, individual legislators should share in the porkbarrel if their leader maintains the cabinet post. Thus, I expect that

**H4:** The better the cabinet representation of a party, the stronger its support to the president on roll calls.

I test this hypothesis by looking at individual parties’ support to the president as a function of the degree to which they are awarded with a fair ministerial payoff. The dependent variable will be operationalized as the percent of the whole lower chamber delegation of a given party voting in accordance with the orientation of the government leader on legislative roll calls. (call it SUPPORT).

\[
\text{SUPPORT}_i = \% \text{ of the whole lower chamber delegation of party } i \text{ voting with the government leader on a given roll call.}
\]
Note that SUPPORT, like COAL, accounts for all forms of non-cooperative behavior vis-
à-vis the president (as represented by his leader on the floor). That is, abstentions and absences
are also included in the denominator.

Ministerial payoff, the key independent variable, will be measured as the ratio of a party’s
percent of ministerial posts to its percent of seats in the legislative contingent of the cabinet
parties (call it PAYOFF). Its formula is:

\[ \text{PAYOFF}_i = \frac{M_i}{S_i} \]

\((M_i \text{ and } S_i \text{ are defined in Section II})\)

So if to a party is allocated 0.35 of ministerial posts, and this party holds 0.60 of seats in
the cabinet parties’ legislative contingent, its score on PAYOFF is 0.35/0.60 = 0.58. If a party
does not receive any cabinet post, its score on PAYOFF is obviously zero. I expect that PAYOFF
will have a positive sign. Table 6 below displays the PAYOFF values for the PMDB, PFL, and

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Additionally, the variable ELAPSE tapping the impact of the electoral cycle on coalition
discipline will also be included in the party-specific tests, as in the tests with aggregate measures
of coalition discipline and cabinet coalescence. Again, I expect that ELAPSE will have a positive
sign. That is to say,

**H5:** *As the president’s term elapses, a party’s support to the president on roll calls declines.*

Finally, the ideological distance between individual parties and the president is clearly a
factor that should affect the former’s willingness to support the latter. The hypothesis in this case
is similar to H3:

**H6:** *The larger the ideological distance between a party and the president, the weaker the former’s support to the latter on roll calls.*

To operationalize the ideological distance between party and president, it is first assumed
that the ideological position of the president is that of his party. How plausible is this
assumption? Obviously, in the real world of politics presidents differ ideologically from their
parties. In general, the reality of power makes presidents more conservatives than their party
when the latter leans to the left. This is the case of president Cardoso and his Party of the
Brazilian Social Democracy. The opposite is also true: when the president’s party is right-
leaning, the chief executive tends to look more progressive. A good example is president
Juscelino Kubitscheck, who ruled Brazil in 1956-1961, and whose policy stances seemed to be to
the left of those of his conservative PSD. At any rate, a president’s party label can be said to
provide a reliable clue as to the central trend relating to presidential preferences over myriad of
policy goals. Once established the president’s ideological position, I posit that the distance
between president and party equals the absolute value of the distance between the position each
is placed on the left-right dimension as defined by the following formula.
\[ \text{DIST} = |P_{\text{pres}} - P_i| \]

where

\[ P_{\text{pres}} = \text{the ideological position on the left-right dimension of the president’s party}; \]
\[ P_i = \text{the ideological position on the left-right dimension of party i}. \]

For example, the ideological distance between a center-right president and a center-left party is 1.0. The only Brazilian president who poses an operational difficulty to DIST is Franco. When he took office in October 1992 he was not affiliated with any party. However, during most of his career he was affiliated with the PMDB, having bolted this party just before his name was placed on Fernando Collor’s presidential slate in 1989. During his presidency, Franco took mostly centrist, moderate positions, just like his former party. Thus, equating Franco’s ideological position to that of the PMDB would not be an egregious violation of reality.

All told, the equation representing the additive effects of the independent variables relating to a party’s office, vote, and policy concerns on its support to the president on rolls calls is as follows:

\[ \text{SUPPORT}_i = \beta_4 + \beta_5\text{PAYOFF} + \beta_6\text{ELAPSE} + \beta_7\text{DIST} + \varepsilon \] (eq. 2)

Results

Table 7 below reports the party-specific regression results. For the PMDB all three independent variables were found significant, and came with the right sign. Holding all else constant, if the PMDB’s payoff ratio jumps from 0.5 (meaning that only half of the party is properly represented in the cabinet) to 1.0 (a perfectly proportional representation in the cabinet), the party’s support to the president should increase by 0.22; if a roll call is taken when there are three years before the end of the president’s term the PMDB’s support to the president should increase by 0.1 relative to a roll call at the end of the term; and if a centrist president is replaced by a rightist one, the PMDB’s support should decline by 0.1.

As for the PFL, PAYOFF, ELAPSE, and DIST had all a significant effect on SUPPORT, although at different levels of significance (0.01, 0.05, and 01, respectively). However, DIST came with the wrong sign, thus confirming the null hypothesis. All else constant, if the PFL’s payoff ratio goes from 0.5 to 1.0, the party’s support to the president should increase by 0.33; a roll call taken three years before the elapse of the president’s term should see the PFL’s support to the president increase by 0.07 relative to a roll call at the end of the term.

Finally, in regard to the PSDB, only PAYOFF and DIST were found significant (both at the 0.01 level), and came with the right sign. All else constant, if the PSDB’s payoff ratio jumps from 0.5 to 1.0, the party’s support to the president should increase by 0.09; and if a centrist president is replaced by a rightist one, the PSDB’s support should decline by 0.15.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\) No autocorrelation problem was found in any of the regressions.
Why did DIST come with the wrong sign for the PFL? Students of conservative politics in Brazil (Hagopian 1996; Power 2000) assert that this party is an essentially clientelistic organization. Parties of this kind are chiefly concerned with the benefits of office. No wonder it joined all the cabinets appointed since 1985. Therefore, the positive sign on DIST in the PFL’s regression equation and its statistical significance can be said to be spurious.

Finally, why did ELAPSE have no significant impact on the PSDB’s support to the president? Among Brazil’s largest parties, the PSDB is certainly the one with the strongest ideological commitments. It is much less clientelistic than the PFL and less heterogeneous than the PMDB. So it can be argued that once the PSDB decides to support or not a government (it did not join either the Sarney and Collor’s first three cabinets), its pattern of relationship with the chief executive will be stable over the president’s term. Therefore, a variable tapping the elapsing of the latter is bound to have no significant impact on this party’s support to the president.

In short, the legislative support given to presidents by Brazil’s two largest parties, the PMDB and PFL, is mainly determined by their ministerial payoff ratio and the elapsing of the president’s term. In the case of a more ideological party such as the PSDB, the ideological distance between president and party also plays a key role, and the elapsing of the president’s term has no significant effect on the party’s support to the chief executive.

VI. Conclusion

Let us now return to the question posed in the introduction: can multiparty presidential cabinets work as coalition arrangements in parliamentary regimes? The analysis of the Brazilian case provided in this chapter allows the following conclusions. First, a presidential cabinet joined by politicians from two or more parties should not be assumed to constitute a coalition executive. Only cabinets displaying a high correspondence between cabinet shares and the parties’ legislative weights (relative to the legislative contingent of the cabinet parties) can be regarded as such in a strict interpretation of the term coalition. Second, a judicious allocation of cabinet posts to parties based on the proportionality norm, particularly if it is early in the president’s term, approximates the legislative behavior of the parties joining a multiparty presidential cabinet to that of coalition partners in a parliamentary regime. That is, higher coalition unity on legislative votes should be observed under presidential cabinets featuring those attributes. Third, more ideological parties display a more consistent coalition behavior over time.

How generalizable are those findings? With all probability, they should hold up for any presidential system in which parties are either not perfectly disciplined or factionalized, and where executive patronage in the form of cabinet positions is an important political currency. So, data availability permitting, equations 1 and 2 can well be applied to countries like Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, pre-Fujimori Peru, and Uruguay. They should not be valid for countries like pre-Chávez Venezuela, because of the perfect discipline of its parties, and the US, owing to the little importance of cabinet posts for political parties.

How does coalition discipline help presidents? First of all, it is important to note that the fact that a Brazilian president happens to count on a more disciplined legislative coalition due to his judicious allocation of cabinet posts to parties does not mean that he has a stable majority in Congress. Table 2 shows that almost all cabinets in Brazil nominally command a majority in the
lower chamber. Yet Brazilian presidents are always striving to achieve legislative majorities. However, if the president’s legislative contingent behaves in a disciplined fashion, this certainly helps the president negotiate a majority with opposition parties because he may bargain with them from a firmer launching base. That is why presidents who appoint more coalescent cabinets tend to be the most stable in Brazil.

The example provided by president Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) is illustrative in that respect. When he took office in March 1990, his party in the Chamber of Deputies, the PRN, commanded only 5.1% of seats. His legislative situation was thus quite difficult in terms of party support, and was further complicated by the generalized perception that he was too far to the right of the political spectrum. Had he wanted to form a stable legislative majority, he would have had to make an enormous number of concessions to the largest parties. However, article 62 of the Constitution empowered him to issue decrees with the force of law (the so-called provisional measures). On his inauguration day, he made his policy making strategy clear: he decided to face the hyper-inflation crisis in which Brazil was enmeshed since 1987 exclusively by means of decrees. He signed no less than 36 decrees in his first 15 days in office (and 163 during 1990), and appointed a cabinet composed mostly of cronies and technocrats.

Collor kept governing by decree during the first year and the beginning of the second year of his term, despite growing dissatisfaction with the way he was handling his relationship with Congress and with the overall performance of his government. Dissatisfaction was so great that in April 1991 Congress nearly approved a bill (the so-called Nelson Jobim Bill), regulating and constraining the issuance of decrees by the executive. According to Power (1998, 211):

> Although Jobim and his allies did not succeed in redefining Article 62 of the Constitution, their effort seems to have resonated among Collor and his advisers. While the Jobim Bill was being considered by Congress in February, March, and April, Collor did not decree a single MP [provisional measure].…. Based on the experience of his first year in office, his restraint was astonishing. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the president imagined his good behavior might save him from having his decree power reduced by an act of Congress.

In a certain sense, the vote on the Jobim Bill was a turning point in the Collor presidency. In 1991 he only signed 8 decrees as compared to 163 in 1990, indicating a a steady decline in his legislative support. Yet throughout 1991 Collor resisted negotiating an agreement with opposition parties so as to improve executive-legislative relations, and insisted on dealing with Congress at arms’ length. This impasse had the effect that 1991 was a year during which little was done to address Brazil’s main problem, hyperinflation. In December 1990 the monthly inflation rate was 16.0%. In December 1991 it was 23.3%. In January of 1992 Collor reshuffled his cabinet to bring more solid support from some conservative parties to his government. We can easily understand why he flagrantly failed to do so: the cabinet scored only 0.30 on the coalescence rate. By the first quarter of 1992, there were disquieting signs that the Collor’s

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13 Data provided by Jorge Vianna Monteiro.
14 Data provided by the Department of Economics of the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro.
15 See *Veja* (a Brazilian weekly magazine), “Faxina em Casa: Collor demite Alceni e Chiarelli, cria um ministério para Bornhausen e convoca o PFL para dar um novo desenho político ao governo” [Cleaning the House: Collors dismisses Alceni and Chiarelli, creates a portfolio for Bornhausen, and calls the PFL to give a new political shape to the government], (January 29, 1992, p. 18-24).
government was completely failing. Monthly inflation rates were still above 20.0%. His popularity was eroding: in March 1992 a nation-wide poll showed that only 15.4% of the respondents considered his government good or very good, as compared to 35.3% in August 1990, 23.3% in March 1991, and 20.4% in August 1991. Moreover, charges of corruption against cabinet ministers and presidential advisers were increasingly making the headlines. It was clear that Collor needed above all to boost his support in Congress to be able to initiate a new, more successful phase of his presidency. By late March 1992 Collor dismissed the whole cabinet and, for the first time in his presidency, publicly avowed that he was opening negotiations with political parties to form a governmental majority in Congress. He ended up forming the most coalescent cabinet of his whole presidency (CABINET = 0.46), thus finally trying to effectively obtain more legislative support by a more sensible allocation of cabinet posts to political parties. Had Collor not been impeached, it can be said that his new cabinet would probably have performed better in terms of coalition support than the previous ones. Obviously this kind of ex-post speculation should always be read with a grain of salt. One wonders why he took so long to change his cabinet so as to obtain more legislative support. A plausible reason is that he was aware that under an actual coalition cabinet the policy making autonomy he had enjoyed in his first year in office would be seriously curtailed. At any rate, the case of Collor shows a clear, if loose, connection between the interaction of cabinet coalescence and coalition support. This sort of example could be multiplied to other Brazilian and Latin American presidents, which is what the quantitative analysis in the chapter shows.

16 These poll data were provided by the Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública (CESOP) of the University of Campinas.

17 See, for example, O Globo (a Rio de Janeiro-based daily newspaper), “Collor dissolve o Governo: irritado com denúncias diárias de corrupção, presidente inicia reforma ampla do ministério” [Collor dissolves the Government: irate with daily corruption charges, the president begins a major cabinet change], (March 31, 1992, p. 3), Folha de São Paulo (a São Paulo-based daily newspaper), “Governo tenta compor base partidária” [Government tries to form a party base], (March 31, 1992, p. 11).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President and Cabinet</th>
<th>Period in Office</th>
<th>Parties Represented in the Cabinet</th>
<th>Cabinet Coalescence Rate</th>
<th>President’s Party and its Nominal Size (% of Seats)</th>
<th>Cabinet’s Ideological Range of the Cabinet</th>
<th>% of Non-partisan Ministers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SARNEY I(^a)</td>
<td>(03/85-02/86)</td>
<td>PMDB-PFL-PTB-PDS</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>PMDB (41.8)</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>1.0 18.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARNEY II</td>
<td>(02/86-01/89)</td>
<td>PMDB-PFL</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>PMDB (44.7)</td>
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<td>PMDB-PFL</td>
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<td>PMDB (35.4)</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>1.0 35.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLLOR I(^b)</td>
<td>(03/90-10/90)</td>
<td>PMDB-PFL-PRN</td>
<td>0.40</td>
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<td>0.46</td>
<td>PRN (6.0)</td>
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<td>1.5 45.0</td>
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<td>1.5 52.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRANCO V</td>
<td>(01/94-01/95)</td>
<td>PMDB-PFL-PSDB-PP</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>no party</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>1.5 76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDOSO I(^c)</td>
<td>(01/95-04/96)</td>
<td>PSDB-PMDB-PFL-PTB</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>PSDB (12.1)</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>1.5 32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDOSO II</td>
<td>(04/96-12/98)</td>
<td>PSDB-PMDB-PFL-PTB-PP</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>PSDB (15.8)</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>1.5 32.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) This cabinet was appointed by president-elect Tancredo Neves (PMDB), who fell ill on the eve of his inauguration. He came to die 38 days later without ever being sworn in.

\(^b\) I disregarded the first minister of Agriculture appointed by Collor, Joaquim Roriz (PST), because he stayed in office only 14 days.

\(^c\) Cardoso’s minister of Culture, Francisco Welfort, was affiliated with the PT when he took office in January 1995. However, he bolted this party soon after his appointment. Hence I decided not to include the PT as one of the parties represented in Cardoso’s cabinet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President and Cabinet</th>
<th>N of Roll Calls</th>
<th>Coalition Discipline Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>PMDB’s Support to the President Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>PFL’s Support to the President Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>PSDB’s Support to the President Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SARNEY I</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARNEY II</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARNEY III</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLOR I</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLOR II</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLOR III</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLOR IV</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCO I</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCO II</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCO III</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCO IV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCO V</td>
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<td>.48</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDOSO I</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDOSO II</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Roll call data provided by Argelina C. Figueiredo, Fernando Limongi, and Jairo Nicolau.
**TABLE 5 - The Determinants of the Coalition Discipline Rate of Cabinet Parties (1989-1998)**

Dependent Variable: Coalition Discipline of the Cabinet Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.107 (0.079)</td>
<td>.094 (0.079)</td>
<td>.258*** (.066)</td>
<td>.503*** (.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABINET</td>
<td>.874*** (.164)</td>
<td>.930*** (.122)</td>
<td>.727*** (.158)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELAPSE</td>
<td>.00007*** (.00002)</td>
<td>.00008*** (.00002)</td>
<td>.00003 (.00002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDRANGE</td>
<td>.012 (.024)</td>
<td>.003 (.024)</td>
<td>.098*** (.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R squared</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Obs=</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.

*** ρ > 0.01; ** ρ > 0.05; * ρ > 0.1.
### TABLE 6 – Ministerial Payoff Ratio of the PMDB, PFL, and PSDB (1985-1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President and Cabinet</th>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>PFL</td>
<td>PSDB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARNEY I</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARNEY II</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARNEY III</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLOR I</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLOR II</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLOR III</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLOR IV</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCO I</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRANCO II</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCO III</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRANCO IV</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRANCO V</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDOSO I</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDOSO II</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the same as for Table 2.
TABLE 7 – The Determinants of Individual Parties’ Support to the President (1989-1998)*

Dependent Variable: Carey-Weighted Support to the President of Individual Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>PMDB</th>
<th>PFL</th>
<th>PSDB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.355***</td>
<td>.224***</td>
<td>.583***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
<td>(.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAYOFF</td>
<td>.447***</td>
<td>.664***</td>
<td>.174***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.049)</td>
<td>(.160)</td>
<td>(.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELAPSE</td>
<td>.0001***</td>
<td>.00007**</td>
<td>—.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00003)</td>
<td>(.00002)</td>
<td>(.00003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIST</td>
<td>—.097*</td>
<td>.076***</td>
<td>—148***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.051)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R squared</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Obs=</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.

*** $p > 0.01$; ** $p > 0.05$; * $p > 0.1$. 