



PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA

DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA

2025.2

ECO **ECO1352 – Economia Política**

CARGA HORÁRIA TOTAL: 60 CRÉDITOS: 4
horas

PRÉ-REQUISITO(S): Econometria I e Microeconomia II

Professor: João Mourão

OBJETIVOS

Ao final do curso, o aluno será capaz de compreender modelos micro-fundamentados que expliquem como a interação entre eleitores, grupos de interesse, incentivos eleitorais e arcabouços institucionais formam endogenamente políticas econômicas em uma democracia representativa. O curso é focado em aplicações empíricas que testam os modelos teóricos apresentados.

EMENTA

Avaliação de impacto: Diferenças-em-Diferenças, Aleatorização, Regressão Descontínua, Variáveis Instrumentais; Instituições; Desenvolvimento Econômico; Equilíbrio do Eleitor Mediano; Voto Probabilístico; Modelos de Agência e Corrupção; Políticos Partidários e Seleção; Economia política da mídia tradicional e de mídias sociais; Polarização e Novos Populismos

CONTATO

João Mourão

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PROGRAMA

1ª Parte

1. Introdução a Economia Política
2. Participação do Eleitor
3. Modelos Básicos de Competição Eleitoral

2ª Parte

4. Modelos de Agência
5. Modelos de Políticos Partidários e Seleção
6. Economia política da mídia tradicional e de mídias sociais

7. Polarização e Novos Populismos

8. Protestos e Democracia Direta*

*Tema pode ser substituído por outro ou por alguma avaliação

AVALIAÇÃO

O critério de avaliação é o número 7, onde:

G1 = Prova dissertativa individual (9 pontos)

Participação ou Resumos da aula (1 pontos)

G2 = Prova dissertativa individual (8 pontos)

Artigo de opinião em dupla (2 pontos)

$$NF = (G1 + G2) / 2$$

Se G1 e G2 $\geq 3,0$ e NF $\geq 6,0$,

então: MÉDIA = NF

Em outros casos o aluno faz G3:

$$MÉDIA = ((G1 + G2 + (G3*2)) / 4$$

Segunda Chamada

Nessa disciplina, a G3 funcionará como segunda chamada.

Datas

03/Outubro: P1,

02/Novembro: 1ª versão artigo

24/Novembro: 2ª versão artigo

28/Novembro: P2;

12/Dezembro: Prova Final

BIBLIOGRAFIA PRINCIPAL

Professor

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Monitor

A definir

BIBLIOGRAFIA GERAL

1. Introdução a Economia Política

Referências principais

Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. Read Ch. 3, “The making of prosperity and poverty”

Persson e Tabellini (2000): Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. chapter 1

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. Handbook of Economic Growth, 1, pp. 385-472.

Outras referências

Você pode assistir esse Ted Talk do James Robinson:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jsZDlBU36n0>

Listen to Podcast EconTalk with Daron Acemoglu: <https://www.econtalk.org/acemogluon-why-nations-fail/>

Persson e Tabellini (2000), Cap. 1

Besley, Timothy (2007), “The New Political Economy”, Economic Journal

2. Métodos de Avaliação de Impacto

Referências principais

Menezes (org.) (2017), “Avaliação Econômica de Projetos Sociais”, Fundação Itaú Social.

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3. Participação dos Eleitores

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(*) Fowler, A. (2013) "Electoral and policy consequences of voter turnout: Evidence from compulsory voting in Australia." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8.2:

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Funk, P. (2010) "Social Incentives and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the Swiss Mail Ballot-System", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 8(5): 1077–1103.

Gentzkow, M. (2006) Television and Voter Turnout. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 121, No. 3, Pages 931-972.

Gine, Xavier and Ghazala Mansuri (2012). "Together we will: Experimental evidence on female voting behavior in Pakistan" *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*.

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Milligan, Kevin, Enrico Moretti, and Philip Oreopoulos, (2004). "Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom" *Journal of Public Economics* 88: 1667-1695.

Washington, E. (2006) "How Black Candidates Affect Voter Turnout," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(3), 973-998.

4. Modelos Básicos de Competição Eleitoral

Modelos de alocação política de recursos, comportamento de eleitores e concorrência política. Teoria do voto, ganhador de Condorcet, modelo Downsiano, equilíbrio do eleitor mediano, modelos de voto probabilístico e concorrência política.

(*) Persson e Tabellini (2000), Cap. 2 e 3

Redistribuição responde às características dos eleitores?

(*) Cascio, Elisabeth and Ebonya Washington (2014) “Valuing the Vote: The Redistribution of Voting Rights and State Funds Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Quarterly Journal of Economics.

(*) Fujiwara, Thomas (2015) "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil, Econometrica, 2015, 83(2): 423-464..

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Outras referências:

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Calderon, Alvaro, Vicky Fouka and Marco Tabellini (2022), “Racial Diversity and Racial Policy Preferences: The Great Migration and Civil Rights”, Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming

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5. Modelos de Agência

Referências Principais

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(*) Avis, Eric, Claudio Ferraz, and Frederico Finan. "Do government audits reduce corruption? Estimating the impacts of exposing corrupt politicians." *Journal of Political Economy* 126.5 (2018): 1912-1964.

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(*) Ferraz, C. e Finan, F. (2011), "Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from the Audit Reports of Local Governments", *American Economic Review* 101: 1274-1311.

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Banerjee, Abhijit et al. (2010), "Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence From Urban India". Mimeo, MIT.

Besley, Timothy And Robin Burgess (2002). "The Political Economy Of Government Responsiveness: Theory And Evidence From India," *Quarterly Journal Of Economics*, vol.117 (4), Pages 1415-1451, November.

Besley T. e A. Case, "Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110, 1995, 769- 798

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Dal Bó, Ernesto and Martín Rossi (2011). "Term Length and the Effort of Politicians," *Review of Economic Studies*, 78(4), 1237-1263.

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6. Modelos Políticos Partidários.

Modelo cidadão-candidato, identidade de políticos.

(*) Persson e Tabellini (2000), Cap. 5

(*) Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler, (2004), "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119 (3), 807-860.

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A identidade dos políticos importa?

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7. Seleção dos políticos

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(*) Caselli, Francesco and Morelli, Massimo (2004). "Bad politicians," *Journal of Public Economics*, vol.88 (3-4), pages 759-782, March.

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8. Informação e Mídia

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Gentzkow, M. and J. Shapiro (2006) "Media Bias and Reputation" *Journal of Political Economy*, 280-316.

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Stromberg, D. and A. Prat (2011) "The Political Economy of Mass Media", *Advances in Economics and Econometrics*. Cambridge University Press. 2013.

Yanagizawa-Drott, David (2014), "Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2014, 129 (4), pp.1947---1994

9. Polarização e Novos Populismos

(*) Gentzkow, M. (2016). Polarization in 2016. *Toulouse Network for Information Technology Whitepaper*, 1.

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(*) Bo', E. D., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2023). Economic and social outsiders but political insiders: Sweden's populist radical right. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 90(2), 675-706.

10. Tópico Extra

Além dos 9 tópicos já citados é possível incluir algum outro assunto no nosso curso. Podemos discutir entre nós para escolher um tema. Segue uma lista não exaustiva das opções:

- Política Redistributiva e Grupos de Interesse
- Cultura e demanda por redistribuição
- Capacidade de Estado e Burocracia
- Protestos e democracia direta
- Tópico extra: Regras Eleitorais