PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA

DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA 2023.2

ECO1222 Economia Política

CARGA HORÁRIA TOTAL: 60h CRÉDITOS: 4

PRÉ-REQUISITO(S): ECO1215

Professor: Marcio Gold Firmo

OBJETIVOS

Ao final do curso, o aluno será capaz de compreender modelos microfundamentados que explicam como a interação entre eleitores, grupos de interesse, incentivos eleitorais e arcabouços institucionais formam endogenamente políticas econômicas em uma democracia representativa. O curso é focado em aplicações empíricas que testam os modelos teóricos apresentados.

EMENTA

Avaliação de impacto: Diferenças-em-Diferenças, Aleatorização, Regressão Descontínua, Variáveis Instrumentais; Instituições; Desenvolvimento Econômico; Equilíbrio do Eleitor Mediano; Voto Probabilístico; Barganha pré-eleitoral; Barganha pós-eleitoral; Ideologia; Regras eleitorais; Eficiência e Corrupção; Redistribuição; Grupos de Interesse.

PROGRAMA

1ª Parte

1. Introdução a Economia Política
2. Métodos de Avaliação de Impacto
3. Participação do Eleitor
4. Modelos Básicos de Competição Eleitoral
5. Modelos Políticos Partidários
6. Modelos de Agência

2ª Parte

7. Cultura e Demanda por redistribuição
8. Políticas Redistributivas e Grupos de interesse
9. Informação e Mídia
10. Capacidade de Estado e Burocracia

11. Protestos e Democracia Direta

AVALIAÇÃO

O critério de avaliação é o número 7, onde:

G1 = Listas de exercícios (3 pontos)
Prova dissertativa individual (7 pontos)

G2 = Trabalho em grupo (3 pontos)
Trabalho individual (1 ponto)
Prova dissertativa individual (6 pontos)

NF = (G1 + G2) / 2

Se G1 e G2 >= 3,0 e NF >= 6,0,
então: MÉDIA = NF

Em outros casos o aluno faz G3:
MÉDIA = ((G1 + G2 + (G3*2)) / 4

CRONOGRAMA

19/outubro: P1,

07/dezembro: P2;

Trabalhos individual e em grupo: apresentações ao longo do curso, concentradas na 2ª parte.

14/dezembro: Prova Final

CONTATO

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Acemoglu D., Johnson S. and Robinson J. (2004) "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth" NBER Working Paper No. 10481. Published: Aghion, Philippe and Stephen Durlauf (eds.) Handbook of Economic Growth. North Pole: 2005.

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2. Métodos de Avaliação de Impacto

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3. Participação dos Eleitores

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Milligan, Kevin, Enrico Moretti, and Philip Oreopoulos, (2004). "Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom" Journal of Public Economics 88: 1667-1695.

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4. Modelos Básicos de Competição Eleitoral

Modelos de alocação política de recursos, comportamento de eleitores e concorrência política. Teoria do voto, ganhador de Condorcet, modelo Downsiano, equilíbrio do eleitormediano, modelos de voto probabilístico e concorrência política.

(*) Persson e Tabellini (2000), Cap. 2 e 3

Redistribuição responde às características dos eleitores?

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5. Modelos Políticos Partidários.

Modelo cidadão-candidato, identidade de políticos.

(*) Persson e Tabellini (2000), Cap. 5

(*) Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler, (2004), "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (3), 807-860.

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A identidade dos políticos importa?

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A qualidade (seleção) dos políticos importa?

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6. Modelos de Agência

(*) Persson e Tabellini, cap. 4

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7. Cultura e Demanda por Redistribuição

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Como políticos redistribuem?

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10. Capacidade de Estado e Burocracia

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11. Protestos e democracia direta

Protestos

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Ação coletiva e democracia direta

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Tópico extra: Regras Eleitorais

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