Political turnover, electoral incentives and public inefficiencies: evidence from unfinished infrastructure projects in Brazil
25/06/2020
Public infrastructure projects like roads and schools have been regarded as drivers of development, yet developing democracies systematically fail to deliver such investments, and half-finished projects are a common issue. Using a novel database of over 75,000 small development projects in Brazil, we estimate that more than 40\% of projects that start are never completed. Employing a close races regression discontinuity design on Brazilian mayoral elections, we find that turnover negatively impacts the delivery of projects inherited in a construction stage, while causes positive responses on the delivery of more recent projects. We argue that our results are consistent with a theory linking project non-conclusion to electoral incentives, where inefficiencies on project procurement are driven by a credit-claim dynamics that disincentives the conclusion of works inherited from the opposition. Our findings highlight the importance of insulating policies from the electoral process in local politics.
Gabriel Anesi S. Granato Ferreira.
Orientador: Claudio Ferraz.
Banca: Juliano Assunção. Marcos Yamada Nakaguma.