Do Neighbors Vote Alike? Evidence from the Brazilian Congress

Advisor: Claudio Ferraz

This work analyses the presence of peer effects in the Brazilian Congress among federal deputy. I test if a deputy is influenced by its nextdoor neighbor when casting a vote for a proposition. Since politicians can select colleagues with similar political position to be their neighbors, I use an office lottery that randomly allocates offices for newcomers and test if office proximity increases the likelihood of agreement. I use data for all 1026 Brazilian federal deputies from 54th and 55th legislature elected in 2010 and 2014 and observe their votes in all propositions held between February 2011 and May 2017. I find that being next-door office neighbors does not increase the probability of agreement. Similar findings are obtained when restricting the sample for different types of proposition, for deputies from the same party, as well as for congressmen from the same state.