This paper considers the problem faced by two regulators in providing incentives to a common (privately informed) regulated firm under various degrees of coordination. In the model, the firm exerts effort toward cost reduction and self-dealing, and incentives can be input-based (monitoring) and output-based (demanded cost targets). Full coordination between the regulators leads to the second best allocation. A setting in which the regulators do not fully coordinate leads to (i) higher overall monitoring (more aggressive input-based incentives) and (ii) higher demanded cost targets (i.e., more lenience in terms of output-based incentives). As a consequence of (i,0), in all possible equilibria, the effort toward cost reduction will be smaller when the agent reports to two regulators who do not coordinate. (i) and (ii) imply that the impact on the effort toward self-dealing activities is ambiguous. In our leading example, self-dealing will be larger if the regulators coordinate on monitoring levels but smaller if they choose monitoring levels independently.

In this paper, we introduce a linearity test for fuzzy rule-based models in the framework of time series modeling. To do so, we explore a family of statistical models, the regime switching autoregressive models, and the relations that link them to the fuzzy rule-based models. From these relations, we derive a Lagrange multiplier linearity test and some properties of the maximum likelihood estimator needed for it. Finally, an empirical study of the goodness of the test is presented

One dimension of competition among stock exchanges is the quality of products they have to offer. In order to attract listings and trading volume, exchanges can affect the quality of their listed firms by altering their standards for firm disclosure and governance. We identify a competition with respect to delisting standards between Korea's two stock exchanges and show that it complies with the three components of a regulatory race to the top: external trigger, mobility among diverse regimes and meaningful changes that converge to similar rules. The race between the two Korean exchanges ended with stricter rules and better protected minority shareholders. The race also ended, however, with neither exchange gaining market share with respect to trading volume or new listings. Korea's experience, therefore, suggests a reason why these races are rare. In the absence of an external trigger, exchanges will be reluctant to enter a race if they think it will result in rule convergence and no winner

Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar os determinantes do diferencial de rendimentos público-privado para diferentes níveis de escolaridade dos trabalhadores no Brasil. Primeiramente, utilizando o rendimento do trabalho principal como variável de interesse, é estimado um hiato de rendimentos bastante favorável ao setor público para trabalhadores com baixa escolaridade. Já para trabalhadores mais qualificados, o hiato tende a desaparecer ou mesmo a tornar-se favorável ao setor privado. Adicionalmente, de maneira a considerar os diferentes regimes de aposentadoria vigentes no país, é definida a variável Valor Presente do Contrato de Trabalho (VPCT) como medida dos rendimentos dos indivíduos ao longo da vida. Diferentemente do resultado encontrado utilizando o rendimento do trabalho, é verificado que o diferencial do VPCT é favorável ao setor público mesmo para trabalhadores com elevados níveis de escolaridade

In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of labor adjustment at the rm level in

Brazilian manufacturing, using information on average hours per worker to measure

employment deviation from desired levels as in Caballero et al. (1997). We use Brazilian

manufacturing data at the establishment level and monthly frequency. The objective is

to estimate the employment adjustment function, which relates the magnitude of em-

ployment changes to the size of employment gaps. The empirical results point to the

presence of nonconvexities in employment adjustment costs in Brazilian manufacturing,

with estimated employment adjustment rates increasing with the size of employment

gaps. On average, employment adjustment rates range from 10% for small employment

gaps to 35% for large ones. The results also show that there is a large proportion of

rms in the sample that do not adjust employment over two consecutive periods. We

run several robustness tests with alternative ways of estimating the employment gaps,

using other forms of dealing with measurement error and a problem of endogeneity of the

hours change variable. Although the magnitudes of employment adjustment rates vary,

we show that: i) the variations are in line with the expected directions of the biases in

estimating the coecient of the hours change variable; and ii) the format of employment

adjustment functions does not change across specications, always revealing that employ-

ment adjustment rates increase with the size of employment gaps, which is compatible

with nonconvex costs of employment adjustment. We also study how the employment

adjustment function varies according to several establishment characteristics, such as

skilled-labor intensity, size, payroll expenses, and overtime payments. We show that the

employment adjustment function tends to have a higher mean and to display larger val-

ues when measured for establishments with characteristics that are arguably related to

lower costs of employment adjustment: larger proportion of low-skilled workers, smaller

size and lower overtime payments.